On the Forgeability of Wang-Tang-Li's ID-Based Restrictive Partially Blind Signature
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Abstract
Restrictive partially blind signature (RPBS) plays an important role in designing secure electronic cash system. Very recently, Wang, Tang and Li proposed a new ID-based restrictive partially blind signature (ID-RPBS) and gave the security proof. In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis of the scheme and show that the signature scheme does not satisfy the property of {\bf unforgeability} as claimed. More precisely, a user can forge a valid message-signature pair $(ID, msg, {\bf info'}, \sigma')$ instead of the original one $(ID, msg, {\bf info}, \sigma)$, where {\bf info} is the original common agreed information and ${\bf info}'\neq {\bf info}$. Therefore, it will be much dangerous if Wang-Tang-Li's ID-RPBS scheme is applied to the off-line electronic cash system. For example, a bank is supposed to issue an electronic coin (or bill) of \$100 to a user, while the user can change the denomination of the coin (bill) to any value, say \$100, 000, 000, at his will.
BibTeX
@article{liu2008forgeability,
author = {Shengli Liu and Xiaofeng Chen and Fangguo Zhang},
title = {{On the Forgeability of Wang-Tang-Li's ID-Based Restrictive Partially Blind Signature}},
journal = {J. Comput. Sci. Technol.},
year = {2008},
url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=eLnRKICbok},
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