Federated Learning in Competitive EV Charging Market

Chenxi Sun, Chao Huang, Biying Shou, Jianwei Huang

TL;DR

While Federated Learning (FL) is often hailed as a "win-win" for improving model accuracy without sacrificing data privacy, this paper reveals a hidden economic sting: in a competitive market, FL can actually decrease profits. By leveling the playing field and improving the Quality of Service (QoS) for all players, FL intensifies price competition, potentially leading to a "race to the bottom" that leaves charging stations worse off than if they had never collaborated.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Electric Vehicle (EV) charging stations compete on two main fronts: price and Quality of Service (QoS). QoS—which includes things like accurate wait-time predictions and optimized charging schedules—relies heavily on machine learning models trained on user data. However, individual stations often suffer from "data scarcity," making it hard to build high-quality models alone.

Federated Learning offers a technical fix by allowing stations to train a shared global model without exchanging raw, sensitive business data. But there is a missing piece in the literature: the economic impact. If two rival stations use FL to improve their services, how does that change their pricing power? The authors investigate whether the boost in service quality is enough to offset the intensified price wars that occur when competitors become more similar.

Methods

The authors model the interaction between two charging stations (a duopoly) and EV owners as a three-stage game, solved using backward induction:

  1. Stage I (FL Participation): Stations decide whether or not to join the FL collaboration.
  2. Stage II (Pricing): Stations set their charging prices based on their current QoS.
  3. Stage III (User Selection): EV owners choose a station based on a Hotelling model, which accounts for charging utility (QoS), price, and the "traveling cost" (distance to the station).

The mathematical challenge lies in the fact that the resulting optimization problem is non-concave. The authors overcome this by decomposing the problem into a piece-wise concave program, allowing them to fully characterize the equilibrium for different market scenarios (monopoly, segmented market, and bifurcated market).

Datasets

The study uses a real-world dataset of 20,000 EV charging sessions from the city of Dundee.

  • Task: Demand prediction (predicting energy consumption in kWh).
  • Features: Charging date, start time, and end time.
  • Evaluation Metric: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE).
  • Data Distribution: To simulate real-world conditions where different stations see different types of users, the authors used a Dirichlet distribution to control the degree of "non-IIDness" (data heterogeneity) between the two stations.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The Similarity Trap: The most striking finding is that FL can be a double-edged sword. While it consistently improves model accuracy (lower RMSE), it reduces the differentiation between stations. When two stations offer nearly identical high-quality service, they are forced to compete almost exclusively on price, which slashes profit margins.
  • QoS vs. Price Competition: The paper proves that a station's optimal price depends on the difference between its QoS and its competitor's QoS. FL often shrinks this gap.
  • The "Mild Dissimilarity" Sweet Spot: Stations are most likely to participate in FL when their data is "mildly dissimilar." If data is too similar, there’s no accuracy gain to be had. If it’s too different, the price competition triggered by the collaboration outweighs the technical benefits.
  • Counter-intuitive Profits: Even if FL is "free" (zero communication/computation cost), Theorem 3 shows it is still not always the optimal strategy. The market dynamics of price competition are a more significant factor than the technical costs of FL.

Key Results

  • Technical Gain: Across all tested levels of data heterogeneity ($\beta$), FL improved the RMSE for both stations compared to local training.
  • Economic Loss: Numerical results showed that for certain data distributions, both stations' profits were lower with FL than without it.
  • Equilibrium Strategy: The "Optimal FL Strategy" plot (Fig 3b) shows that stations only choose to collaborate (the "Y" region) when the data heterogeneity parameter $\beta$ is around 1. When data is highly skewed ($\beta = 0.01$) or nearly identical ($\beta \geq 50$), the stations naturally opt out of FL to protect their market position.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Duopoly Constraint: The current model focuses on a two-station market. Real-world markets often involve multiple providers, which would significantly complicate the game-theoretical analysis.
  • Linear QoS Function: The authors primarily used a linear relationship between model performance (RMSE) and QoS. While they mention testing quadratic and logarithmic functions with similar results, a more complex mapping of "model accuracy to user satisfaction" could be explored.
  • Future Directions: The authors plan to extend this work to multi-provider scenarios and explore more complex charging service types (e.g., fast vs. slow charging) within the FL framework.

Summary updated

Abstract

Federated Learning (FL) has demonstrated a significant potential to improve the quality of service (QoS) of EV charging stations. While existing studies have primarily focused on developing FL algorithms, the effect of FL on the charging stations’ operation in terms of price competition has yet to be fully understood. This paper aims to fill this gap by modeling the strategic interactions between two charging stations and EV owners as a multi-stage game. Each station first decides its FL participation strategy and charging price, and then individual EV owners decide their charging strategies. The game analysis involves solving a non-concave problem and by decomposing it into a piece-wise concave program we manage to fully characterize the equilibrium. Based on real-world datasets, our numerical results reveal an interesting insight: even if FL improves QoS, it can lead to smaller profits for both stations. The key reason is that FL intensifies the price competition between charging stations by improving stations’ QoS to a similar level. We further show that the stations will participate in FL when their data distributions are mildly dissimilar.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{sun2023federated,
  author = {Chenxi Sun and Chao Huang and Biying Shou and Jianwei Huang},
  title = {{Federated Learning in Competitive EV Charging Market}},
  booktitle = {ISGT EUROPE},
  year = {2023},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=kPekOTpbcn},
}
Figure