Fair Division with Market Values

Siddharth Barman, Soroush Ebadian, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah

TL;DR

This paper introduces and analyzes the problem of fair division where goods have both subjective values for agents and an objective market value. They explore various fairness criteria, showing that while strong simultaneous fairness is often impossible, weaker but still meaningful guarantees can be achieved, particularly when leveraging market values as a constraint.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The traditional fair division problem focuses on dividing goods among agents based on their individual, subjective preferences. However, real-world scenarios often involve an objective "fair market value" that also needs to be considered, especially in legal or financial contexts. This paper bridges this gap by studying fair division where allocations must be fair with respect to both agents' heterogeneous subjective valuations and a common, objective market valuation. This dual requirement presents a significant challenge, as optimizing for one can conflict with the other. The authors aim to understand what fairness guarantees are achievable under these combined constraints, moving beyond purely subjective fairness.

Methods

The paper introduces a formal model for fair division with market values, considering both indivisible goods and divisible goods (cake-cutting). They analyze several fairness criteria, including:

  • Envy-Freeness up to One Good (EF1): No agent prefers another's bundle if one item is removed from the other's bundle.
  • Stochastically Dominant Envy-Freeness up to One Good (SD-EF1): A stronger version of EF1 where the comparison is based on a more robust notion of preference.
  • Pareto Optimality (PO): No allocation can be improved for one agent without making another worse off.
  • Maximin Share Fairness (MMS) and Envy-Freeness up to Any Good (EFX): Other established fairness notions.

The authors employ a mix of theoretical analysis, constructive algorithms (often building on existing work in fair division and market equilibria), and impossibility proofs through carefully crafted counterexamples. They leverage concepts like "MBB alternating paths" from Fisher market theory to design algorithms and analyze trade-offs.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper focuses on theoretical analysis and algorithmic design, using constructed instances for proofs rather than real-world datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Market Value as a Constraint: The market value isn't just another subjective preference; it acts as an objective constraint or a secondary fairness criterion that can significantly limit achievable allocations.
  • Impossibility of Strong Simultaneous Fairness: Achieving the strongest fairness notions (like SD-EF1) simultaneously for both subjective utilities and market values is often impossible, even with a small number of agents and goods.
  • Guaranteed Weaker Fairness: While strong fairness might be unattainable, the paper demonstrates that weaker but still valuable guarantees (e.g., EF1 for subjective utilities and SD-EF1 for market values) are always achievable.
  • Leveraging Market Mechanisms: The paper shows how concepts from Fisher markets can be adapted to design algorithms for fair division with market values, particularly for achieving Pareto optimality alongside other fairness criteria.
  • Cake-Cutting Extension: The framework extends naturally to divisible goods (cake-cutting), revealing similar trade-offs and the potential for efficient algorithms with a limited number of cuts.

Key Results

  • Impossibility of SD-EF1: No allocation can simultaneously satisfy SD-EF1 for both subjective utilities and market values in general instances (Theorem 1).
  • Guaranteed EF1 + SD-EF1: An allocation that is EF1 w.r.t. subjective utilities and SD-EF1 w.r.t. market values always exists and can be computed efficiently (Corollary 1).
  • PO and Market Value Fairness: An allocation that is Pareto optimal w.r.t. subjective utilities and EF1 w.r.t. market values always exists (Theorem 5).
  • MMS/EFX Impossibilities: Stronger fairness notions like MMS and EFX lead to stark impossibility results when combined with market values, even when swapped with EF1 (Theorems 6 & 7).
  • Cake Division Bounds: For cake division, lower bounds on cuts are established (2n-2), while upper bounds are provided (n(n-1) cuts), with a specific case for identical utilities requiring 2n-2 cuts (Theorems 10 & 12).

Limitations and Future Work

  • Open Questions: The paper highlights several open questions, including whether SD-EF1 on the agent side and EF1 on the market side is always achievable (Open Question 1), and similar questions for Pareto optimality and envy-freeness in cake division.
  • Monotone Valuations: While the paper focuses on additive valuations, extending results to more general monotone valuations for both subjective utilities and market values remains an active area of research (Open Questions 3 & 4).
  • Computational Complexity: While some results guarantee existence, finding efficient algorithms for all combinations of fairness criteria and valuation types is an ongoing challenge.
  • Generalizing Market Values: The paper primarily considers a single market value. Extending to heterogeneous market values for different agents or more complex market valuation structures could be a future direction.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{barman2025fair,
  author = {Siddharth Barman and Soroush Ebadian and Mohamad Latifian and Nisarg Shah},
  title = {{Fair Division with Market Values}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1609/aaai.v39i13.33484},
}
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