Extensive-form Games with Heterogeneous Populations ( Extended Abstract)

Nicola Gatti, Fabio Panozzo, Marcello Restelli

Abstract

The adoption of Nash equilibrium (NE) in real–world settings is often impractical due to its too restrictive assumptions. Game theory and artificial intelligence provide alternative solution concepts. When knowledge about opponents utilities and types is not available, the appropriate solution concept for extensive–form games is the self–confirming equilibrium (SCE), which relaxes NE allowing agents to have incorrect beliefs off the equilibrium path. In this paper, we extend SCEs to capture situations in which a two–agent extensive–form game is played by heterogeneous populations of individuals that repeatedly match (e.g., eBay).
BibTeX
@inproceedings{gatti2013extensive,
  author = {Nicola Gatti and Fabio Panozzo and Marcello Restelli},
  title = {{Extensive-form Games with Heterogeneous Populations ( Extended Abstract)}},
  booktitle = {AAMAS},
  year = {2013},
}

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