Extended Version: Characterizing Distributed Photovoltaic Panel Investment Equilibria

Mehdi Davoudi, Junjie Qin, Xiaojun Lin

TL;DR

This paper explores the "feedback loop" between short-term electricity market prices and long-term rooftop solar adoption. By modeling individual investors in a non-atomic game, the authors prove that treating solar as a distinct, premium product leads to socially optimal investment, while traditional pooled markets consistently lead to under-investment.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

As rooftop solar (distributed PV) becomes a major part of the energy grid, investment decisions are moving from centralized utilities to millions of individual households and businesses. These investors decide to install panels based on the revenue they expect to earn from the market over 25 years.

However, there is a catch: as more people install solar, the "excess" energy during sunny hours can drive market prices down, which in turn reduces the incentive for the next person to invest. Most existing research looks at this from the perspective of a single investor or a central planner. This paper addresses the gap by modeling the equilibrium—the point where the collective decisions of many small investors stabilize—and asks how different market designs (how we actually trade that power) change the final amount of solar installed.

Methods

The authors develop a mathematical framework using a non-atomic game. In this model, each investor is "infinitesimal," meaning one person’s decision doesn't move the needle, but the aggregate behavior of the population does.

They analyze three specific market mechanisms:

  1. Single-Product Real-Time (SRT): Solar and grid power are pooled. Consumers pay one price regardless of the source.
  2. Product-Differentiated Real-Time (PRT): Solar is treated as a premium product. Environmentally conscious consumers can pay extra (a "solar premium") for solar-generated electrons.
  3. Contract-Based (CB): Instead of selling power as it's generated, investors rent out "units of capacity" to users in advance (ex-ante).

The study uses a Unified Modeling Framework to derive closed-form expressions for the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of aggregate solar capacity for each design and compares them against a Social Welfare Optimal benchmark.

Datasets

The authors validated their theoretical proofs using a case study based on California's energy landscape:

  • Solar Irradiation: 22 years of data (2000–2022) from the National Solar Radiation Database (NSRDB) for San Francisco.
  • Consumer Preferences: Survey data on "willingness to pay" for renewable energy to model the solar premium.
  • Market Conditions: 2023 California retail electricity prices (~29 ¢/kWh) and hourly load data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
  • Costs: Average PV installation costs (~$2.7/watt) sourced from NREL reports.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The "Aha" on Differentiation: The paper proves that the Product-Differentiated (PRT) market is the only one that naturally hits the socially optimal level of investment. This is because it allows the market to capture the "hidden" value that green-conscious consumers place on solar, which then flows back to the investors.
  • The Failure of Pooling: In the Single-Product (SRT) market, the extra value consumers might have for solar is lost. This leads to a "missing money" problem where the equilibrium capacity is always lower than what is socially ideal.
  • The Over-Investment Surprise: Interestingly, the Contract-Based (CB) market can lead to over-investment when solar premiums are small. While "over-investment" sounds negative in a static model, the authors note this might actually be a policy feature: it could help drive economies of scale in manufacturing.
  • No Premium, No Difference: If consumers don't care whether their power is "green" or "grey" (zero solar premium), all three market designs eventually converge to the same investment equilibrium.

Key Results

  • Theoretical Ordering: The study mathematically established the relationship: SRT Capacity ≤ PRT (Socially Optimal) Capacity.
  • Numerical Gap: In the California simulation, the socially optimal capacity was found to be 70.42 GW. The standard SRT market resulted in only 67.88 GW (an under-investment of about 3.6%), while the contract-based market pushed investment up to 71.57 GW.
  • Sensitivity to Costs: As installation costs decrease, the gap between these market designs widens, suggesting that market design becomes more critical as solar technology gets cheaper.

Limitations and Future Work

The current model assumes uniform buy/sell pricing, meaning it doesn't fully account for complex "Net Energy Metering" (NEM) structures where sell-back rates might differ significantly from purchase rates. It also assumes investors are homogeneous (having the same costs and risk tolerances).

The authors suggest that future research should incorporate investor heterogeneity (e.g., some people are more risk-averse than others) and explore how risk preferences affect long-term investment stability in volatile real-time markets.

Summary updated

Abstract

This study investigates long-term investment decisions in distributed photovoltaic panels by individual investors. We consider a setting where investment decisions are driven by expected revenue from participating in short-term electricity markets over the panel lifespan. These revenues depend on short-term market equilibria, i.e., prices and allocations, which are influenced by aggregate invested panel capacity participating in the markets. We model the interactions among investors by a non-atomic game and develop a framework that links short-term market equilibria to the resulting long-term investment equilibrium. Then, within this framework, we analyze three market mechanisms: (a) a single-product real-time energy market, (b) a product-differentiated real-time energy market that treats solar energy and grid energy as different products, and (c) a contract-based panel market that trades claims/rights to the production of certain panel capacity ex-ante, rather than the realized solar production ex-post. For each, we derive expressions for short-term equilibria and the associated expected revenues, and analytically characterize the corresponding long-term Nash equilibrium aggregate capacity. We compare the solutions of these characterizing equations under different conditions and theoretically establish that the product-differentiated market always supports socially optimal investment, while the single-product market consistently results in under-investment. We also establish that the contract-based market leads to over-investment when the extra valuations of users for solar energy are small. Finally, we validate our theoretical results through numerical experiments.
BibTeX
@misc{davoudi2025extended,
  author = {Mehdi Davoudi and Junjie Qin and Xiaojun Lin},
  title = {{Extended Version: Characterizing Distributed Photovoltaic Panel Investment Equilibria}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2509.07203},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.07203},
}

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