Equilibrium Behavior in Competing Dynamic Matching Markets

Zhuoshu Li, Neal Gupta, Sanmay Das, John P. Dickerson

Introduction

Dynamic matching markets, such as ridesharing platforms and organ exchange networks, are typically studied as centralized systems. However, in practice, these markets often compete for the same pool of participants. This competition introduces strategic complexities for both the agents participating in the markets and the market operators themselves. This paper investigates how competition affects market efficiency and social welfare, revealing a pervasive "race to the bottom" where competitive pressures lead to sub-optimal matching policies.

Strategic Agent Behavior

In a competitive environment, participants (agents) must strategically decide which market to join. This decision is influenced by the market's matching policy. A "Greedy" policy matches agents as soon as a compatible partner is found, while a "Patient" policy waits until an agent is close to "perishing" (leaving the market) to maximize the chance of finding a better match.

The authors' first model explores this by analyzing equilibria where agents of different types (short-lived vs. long-lived) choose between a Greedy and a Patient market. A key finding is the existence of separating equilibria, where different agent types gravitate toward different markets. Interestingly, short-lived agents often prefer the Patient market because its greater "thickness" increases their overall probability of matching before they perish, despite the longer wait.

Expected utility for long-lived and short-lived agents across different market policies and agent densities ($\theta$).

As shown in the figure above, the expected utility for agents varies significantly based on the density of participants ($\theta$). In regions of low density, agents may pool into a single market, while higher densities can lead to separation or pooling into the more efficient patient policy.

Market Competition and the "Race to the Bottom"

The second model shifts focus to the market operators. Here, markets strategically choose their matching frequency to attract participants, particularly those who "multi-home" (join multiple platforms). When markets compete for these overlapping participants, they are incentivized to match as quickly as possible to "capture" the match before their rival does.

This competitive dynamic often leads to a (Greedy, Greedy) equilibrium. While individual markets act rationally to maximize their own matched volume, the aggregate result is a significant loss in social welfare. The "thickness" of the market is sacrificed for speed, leading to a higher overall rate of unmatched agents.

Loss rate and equilibrium outcomes as a function of market overlap ($\gamma_1$) for various cross-market participation levels ($\gamma_2$).

The simulations demonstrate that as market overlap ($\gamma_1$) and cross-market participation ($\gamma_2$) increase, the system increasingly converges toward the socially sub-optimal Greedy-Greedy equilibrium (indicated by darker markers). The red line represents the baseline loss rate of a single centralized market (~18.2%), highlighting the substantial "fragmentation penalty" incurred under competition, where loss rates can climb to 24-27%.

Conclusion and Implications

The research concludes that competition in dynamic matching markets inherently reduces social welfare compared to a centralized, patient matching system. This loss stems from two factors: market fragmentation, which reduces the statistical gains of a thick market, and the strategic "race to the bottom" in matching speed.

These findings have significant policy implications, especially for high-stakes markets like organ donation. They suggest that decentralized competition may be fundamentally inefficient and that regulatory interventions or centralized clearinghouses may be necessary to ensure optimal outcomes for participants.

Summary updated

Abstract

Rival markets like rideshare services, universities, and organ exchanges compete to attract participants, seeking to maximize their own utility at potential cost to overall social welfare. Similarly, individual participants in such multi-market systems also seek to maximize their individual utility. If entry is costly, they should strategically enter only a subset of the available markets. All of this decision making---markets competitively adapting their matching strategies and participants arriving, choosing which market(s) to enter, and departing from the system---occurs dynamically over time. This paper provides the first analysis of equilibrium behavior in dynamic competing matching market systems---first from the points of view of individual participants when market policies are fixed, and then from the points of view of markets when agents are stochastic. When compared to single markets running social-welfare-maximizing matching policies, losses in overall social welfare in competitive systems manifest due to both market fragmentation and the use of non-optimal matching policies. We quantify such losses and provide policy recommendations to help alleviate them in fielded systems.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{li2018equilibrium,
  author = {Zhuoshu Li and Neal Gupta and Sanmay Das and John P. Dickerson},
  title = {{Equilibrium Behavior in Competing Dynamic Matching Markets}},
  booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2018/54},
}
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