Endogenous Resistance to Activation Steering in Language Models

Alex McKenzie, Keenan Pepper, Stijn Servaes, Martin Leitgab, Murat Cubuktepe, Michael Vaiana, Diogo S de Lucena, Judd Rosenblatt, Michael S. A. Graziano

TL;DR

Large language models can sometimes "catch themselves" when steered off-topic, verbally correcting their output mid-generation and continuing on task. This "Endogenous Steering Resistance" (ESR) is more pronounced in larger models like Llama-3.3-70B and can be amplified with specific prompts, suggesting a potential defense against adversarial steering but also a challenge for beneficial interventions.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable, understanding their internal mechanisms for maintaining coherence and resisting unwanted influences is crucial for AI alignment and safety. Specifically, researchers are exploring how LLMs react when their internal "activations" (the numerical representations that drive their behavior) are artificially manipulated to steer them towards off-topic content. This paper investigates whether LLMs can detect and recover from such "activation steering" perturbations, even when the steering signal persists throughout generation. This phenomenon, termed Endogenous Steering Resistance (ESR), has implications for both hardening models against malicious attacks and understanding the limits of beneficial steering-based interventions.

Methods

The core of the study involves "activation steering," a technique where specific directions in the model's internal activation space are modified to influence its output. The authors utilize Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to identify interpretable "latents" (features) within these activations. By boosting a specific SAE latent that is semantically unrelated to the prompt, they induce off-topic generation. They then analyze the model's response using a judge model that identifies and scores separate "attempts" within a single generation. Explicit ESR is measured by the rate at which a model makes multiple attempts and improves its score in the later attempts. They also employ various control experiments, including:

  • Prefilling Control: To test if recovery is purely text-conditioned, they prefill the model with off-topic text and see if it self-corrects without active steering.
  • Matched-Prefix Experiment: To assess the role of autoregressive conditioning, they compare continuations with and without an on-topic prefix.
  • Latent Ablation: They zero out specific SAE latents identified as contributing to self-correction to test their causal role.
  • Meta-Prompting: They investigate if simple instructions can enhance ESR.
  • Fine-tuning: They train a model on synthetic self-correction examples to see if ESR can be induced.

Datasets

The paper primarily uses publicly available LLMs from the Llama-3 and Gemma-2 families. For SAEs, they utilize the Goodfire SAEs for Llama models and GemmaScope SAEs for Gemma models. The prompts used are a curated set of 38 "explain how" object-level questions covering topics from math to basic business skills. For synthetic data generation for fine-tuning, they prompt Claude 4.5 Sonnet.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • LLMs Can Self-Correct Under Steering: The most striking finding is that LLMs, particularly larger ones, can detect and recover from activation steering, even when the steering signal is continuously applied. This suggests a form of internal monitoring or resistance.
  • Model Scale Matters: ESR is significantly more pronounced in larger models (Llama-3.3-70B) compared to smaller ones, indicating that scale plays a crucial role in this emergent capability.
  • Controllable Resistance: ESR can be deliberately enhanced through simple meta-prompts, suggesting that this resistance mechanism is not entirely fixed and can be influenced by external instructions.
  • Latents are Causal: Specific SAE latents are identified as causally contributing to ESR. Ablating these latents reduces the rate of self-correction, pointing towards specific internal mechanisms.
  • Dual Safety Implications: ESR presents a double-edged sword for AI safety. It could act as a defense against adversarial steering attacks but might also interfere with beneficial steering interventions designed for safety.

Key Results

  • Llama-3.3-70B Exhibits Strong ESR: Llama-3.3-70B shows an ESR rate of 3.8%, substantially higher than smaller models (Gemma-2 and Llama-3.1-8B), which exhibit rates below 1%.
  • Latent Ablation Reduces ESR: Ablating 26 identified self-correction-associated SAE latents reduces the ESR rate by 25%.
  • Meta-Prompts Boost ESR: A meta-prompt like "If you notice yourself going off-topic, stop and force yourself to get back on track" increases the multi-attempt rate by 4.3x in Llama-3.3-70B.
  • Detection vs. Correction: The "detection" of being off-topic (initiating a restart) is largely text-conditioned, while the "resistance" to staying on-topic after correction is partially explained by autoregressive conditioning but not fully.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Model Scale Disentanglement: The study cannot disentangle whether the observed ESR differences are due to model scale, architecture, or training data.
  • Metric Specificity: The primary metric (explicit ESR) relies on verbal restarts, potentially missing implicit or non-verbalized recovery.
  • Latent Heterogeneity: The identified "self-correction-associated" latents are a heterogeneous set, and their precise roles are not fully characterized.
  • Fine-tuning Limitations: Fine-tuning on synthetic self-correction examples induced the behavior of self-correction but not necessarily improved success rate, suggesting imitation rather than true capability enhancement.
  • Future Directions: The authors suggest exploring fine-tuning under active steering, investigating cross-layer patching for circuit identification, and examining ESR in the context of safety-relevant steering (e.g., toward harmful content).

Summary updated

Abstract

Large language models can resist task-misaligned activation steering during inference, recovering mid-generation to produce improved responses even when steering remains active. We term this Endogenous Steering Resistance (ESR). Using sparse autoencoder (SAE) latents to steer Llama-3.3-70B and smaller models, we find ESR occurs substantially more in Llama-3.3-70B (3.8\% vs.\ $<$1\% for others). We identify 26 SAE latents causally linked to ESR: ablating them reduces ESR by 25\%. Meta-prompts enhance ESR 4$\times$, demonstrating controllability. These findings have dual safety implications: ESR could protect against adversarial manipulation but might interfere with beneficial activation-based safety interventions.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{mckenzie2026endogenous,
  author = {Alex McKenzie and Keenan Pepper and Stijn Servaes and Martin Leitgab and Murat Cubuktepe and Michael Vaiana and Diogo S de Lucena and Judd Rosenblatt and Michael S. A. Graziano},
  title = {{Endogenous Resistance to Activation Steering in Language Models}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=fYbuhXJ3iq},
}
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