Empirical Mechanism Design: Designing Mechanisms from Data

Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Cyrus Cousins, Yasser Mohammad, Amy Greenwald

Abstract

Traditional mechanism design relies on analytical descriptions of games to optimize rules like reserve prices. However, real-world systems such as advertisement exchanges are often too complex for closed-form solutions, existing instead as black-box simulators. This paper introduces a robust framework for Empirical Mechanism Design (EMD) that optimizes these systems using only data. By integrating Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning with a novel Bayesian Optimization heuristic tailored for "piecewise constant noise," the authors provide a method to efficiently find revenue-maximizing parameters. The framework utilizes Strongly Connected Components (SCCs) as a stable equilibrium concept, demonstrating significant performance gains in both symmetric first-price auctions and high-fidelity advertisement exchange simulations.

Introduction

In mechanism design, a designer establishes rules to guide strategic agents toward a desired outcome, typically revenue maximization. While theoretical models often assume simple, mathematically tractable games, modern digital markets—like ad exchanges—are characterized by high-dimensional parameter spaces and stochastic environments. These systems are frequently represented as black-box simulators where the underlying utility functions are unknown.

The challenge of designing mechanisms in such environments is two-fold. First, the Inner Loop requires estimating agent equilibrium behavior from limited simulator data. Second, the Outer Loop involves searching a vast parameter space for optimal rules. This paper addresses these challenges by combining PAC learning for game estimation with efficient Bayesian Optimization (BO) for parameter search.

Methods

The proposed methodology bridges game theory and machine learning through three key components:

  1. PAC Learning for Games: The authors use the PAC framework to provide theoretical guarantees on the data volume required to accurately estimate a game's utilities.
  2. SCCs as Equilibrium: Instead of Nash Equilibrium, which is computationally intensive and potentially unstable under approximation, the authors employ Strongly Connected Components (SCCs) of the "better-response graph." They prove that SCC equilibria are robust to uniform approximations, ensuring that small errors in data-driven models do not lead to wildly different predicted behaviors.
Figure 1: Payoff matrix and the corresponding better-response graph illustrating Strongly Connected Components (SCCs) as an equilibrium concept.
  1. Bayesian Optimization with Custom Noise: Standard BO typically assumes Gaussian noise. However, PAC learners produce "piecewise constant noise." The authors derive a "Best Approximating Gaussian" to map this noise into a Gaussian Process (GP), leading to two heuristics: GP-N (modeling variance) and GP-M (focusing on the mean to improve exploration).

Results

The framework was evaluated on two environments: Symmetric First-Price Auctions (FPA) and a high-fidelity AdX (Advertisement Exchange) game based on the Trading Agent Competition. The AdX game features an 8-dimensional parameter space for reserve prices and complex agent strategies.

Key results indicate that the GP-M heuristic reaches near-optimal revenue significantly faster than uniform sampling or standard GPs. In the complex AdX environment, the proposed BO methods consistently discovered higher-revenue settings than baselines.

Figure 4: Comparison of optimization algorithms (random, gp, gpm, gpn) showing the running maximum revenue against the number of reserve prices searched for different noise levels.

Conclusion

This work demonstrates that empirical mechanism design is computationally feasible for complex, black-box systems. While SCCs provide a stable and computable solution concept, they are relatively coarse. Future research may explore extending this PAC-BO framework to more refined equilibrium concepts like Nash or Quantal Response Equilibrium, as well as further reducing the computational cost of the inner-loop equilibrium estimation.

Summary updated

Abstract

We introduce a methodology for the design of parametric mechanisms, which are multiagent systems inhabited by strategic agents, with knobs that can be adjusted to achieve specific goals. We assume agents play approximate equilibria, which we estimate using the probably approximately correct learning framework. Under this assumption, we further learn approximately optimal mechanism parameters. We do this theoretically, assuming a finite design space, and heuristically, using Bayesian optimization (BO). Our BO algorithm incorporates the noise associated with modern concentration inequalities, such as Hoeffding’s, into the underlying Gaussian process. We show experimentally that our search techniques outperform standard baselines in a stylized but rich model of advertisement exchanges.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{viqueira2019empirical,
  author = {Enrique Areyan Viqueira and Cyrus Cousins and Yasser Mohammad and Amy Greenwald},
  title = {{Empirical Mechanism Design: Designing Mechanisms from Data}},
  booktitle = {Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2019},
}
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