Efficient and Secure Post-Quantum Certificateless Signcryption for Internet of Medical Things

Shiyuan Xu, Xue Chen, Yu Guo, Siu-Ming Yiu, Shang Gao, Bin Xiao

TL;DR

Researchers have developed PQ-CLSC, a new cryptographic scheme designed to protect medical data in the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) against both current and future quantum-computing threats. By leveraging lattice-based mathematics and eliminating computationally heavy algorithms, the scheme achieves a 45%–70% reduction in overhead compared to existing post-quantum methods, making it practical for resource-constrained medical devices.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) allows doctors to monitor patients remotely using wearable sensors. However, this sensitive data is a prime target for hackers. Traditional security faces a "trilemma" in this context:

  1. Management Overhead: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) requires complex certificate management.
  2. Key Escrow Risks: Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) gives a central authority (KGC) too much power, allowing them to potentially decrypt any message or forge signatures.
  3. The Quantum Threat: Most current encryption (like RSA or Elliptic Curve) will be easily broken by future quantum computers.

While "Certificateless Signcryption" (CLSC) solves the first two problems by splitting key generation between a central authority and the user, existing versions are often too slow for tiny medical devices or aren't "quantum-safe."

Methods

The authors propose PQ-CLSC, a lattice-based signcryption scheme. Its core innovation lies in balancing security and speed:

  • Lattice-Based Hardness: The security of the scheme relies on the Learning With Errors (LWE) and Short Integer Solution (SIS) problems. These are mathematical puzzles that remain difficult even for quantum computers.
  • Efficiency Gains: Most lattice-based schemes use an algorithm called SamplePre, which is notoriously slow. The authors avoided this, instead using a combination of TrapGen (to generate master keys) and SampleD (for partial keys) alongside standard hash functions.
  • Sign-then-Encrypt Primitive: Rather than running a signature and then an encryption separately (which doubles the work), the scheme combines them into a single logical step.
  • Certificateless Architecture: A Key Generation Center (KGC) provides a "partial" secret key, and the user generates the rest. This prevents the KGC from being able to read the data (solving the key escrow problem) while removing the need for digital certificates.

Datasets

As a theoretical and algorithmic paper, it does not use a traditional "data" benchmark (like ImageNet). Instead, the authors evaluated performance through:

  • Simulated Operations: They measured the execution time of core operations (vector multiplication, additive operations, etc.) using MATLAB on a system with an AMD Ryzen 7 5800H processor and 16GB of RAM.
  • Comparative Analysis: They benchmarked their scheme against five other state-of-the-art lattice-based signcryption schemes (Li et al., Zhang et al., Yan et al., etc.) to compare ciphertext length and computational latency.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The "SamplePre" Bottleneck: The biggest "aha" moment is the realization that the SamplePre algorithm is the primary reason previous post-quantum schemes were too slow for IoMT. By redesigning the key extraction and signcryption process to avoid it, they achieved massive speedups.
  • Dual-Type Adversary Protection: The paper proves the scheme is secure against two types of attackers: "Type-I" (who can replace public keys but doesn't know the master secret) and "Type-II" (a malicious central authority who knows the master secret but can't replace user keys).
  • Practicality for IoMT: The authors emphasize that for medical tech, "secure" isn't enough—it must be "fast enough" to not drain batteries or cause delays in emergency data transmission.

Key Results

  • Speed: The total computation time (signcryption + unsigncryption) is approximately 31.634 ms.
  • Reduced Overhead: The signcryption overhead is only 30%–55% of prior lattice-based arts.
  • Computational Efficiency: The overall computation cost is roughly 45% of existing schemes.
  • Communication Efficiency: The ciphertext length is $2kn \log^2 q$, which the authors demonstrate is significantly lower than competing lattice-based mechanisms.
  • Security Proofs: The scheme was formally proven to satisfy IND-CCA2 (confidentiality) and EU-CMA (unforgeability) in the random oracle model.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Hardware Implementation: While the MATLAB simulations are promising, the paper does not test the scheme on actual low-power IoMT hardware (like an ARM Cortex-M series microcontroller), where memory constraints are even tighter.
  • Network Integration: The study focuses on the cryptographic primitive itself. Future work could explore how this integrates into specific IoMT protocols or 5G/6G medical networks.
  • Standardization: Like all post-quantum candidates, the specific parameter selections (like the size of the lattice) will need to be vetted against evolving cryptanalysis standards.

Summary updated

Abstract

Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) has gained significant research focus in both academic and medical institutions. Nevertheless, the sensitive data involved in IoMT raises concerns regarding user validation and data privacy. To address these concerns, certificateless signcryption (CLSC) has emerged as a promising solution, offering authenticity, confidentiality, and unforgeability. Unfortunately, most existing CLSC schemes are impractical for IoMT due to their heavy computational and storage requirements. Additionally, these schemes are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. Therefore, research focusing on designing an efficient post-quantum CLSC scheme is still far-reaching. In this work, we propose PQ-CLSC, a novel post-quantum CLSC scheme that ensures quantum safety for IoMT. Our proposed design facilitates secure transmission of medical data between physicians and patients, effectively validating user legitimacy and minimizing the risk of private information leakage. To achieve this, we leverage lattice sampling algorithms and hash functions to generate the particial secret key and then employ the sign-then-encrypt method to obtain the ciphertext. We also formally and prove the security of our design, including indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks (EU-CMA) security. Finally, through comprehensive performance evaluation, our signcryption overhead is only 30%-55% compared to prior arts, while our computation overhead is just around 45% of other existing schemes. The evaluation results demonstrate that our solution is practical and efficient.
BibTeX
@article{xu2024efficient,
  author = {Shiyuan Xu and Xue Chen and Yu Guo and Siu-Ming Yiu and Shang Gao and Bin Xiao},
  title = {{Efficient and Secure Post-Quantum Certificateless Signcryption for Internet of Medical Things}},
  journal = {IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
  year = {2024},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=laKlOdZb7P},
}

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