Abstract
Based on the natural experiment of carbon emissions trading pilots in China, this paper investigates the effect of environmental regulation on corporate tax avoidance. The results show that: 1) Market-incentivized environmental regulation significantly increases the level of corporate tax avoidance. 2) Heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect is more obvious on non-state-owned firms, firms with severe financing constraints, and firms in highly competitive industries. 3) We find that the reduction of cash flow is the channel through which environmental regulation affects corporate tax avoidance. 4) Further analysis shows that government subsidies can alleviate the enhancement of tax avoidance by environmental regulation. The more government subsidies a company receives, the less tax avoidance it exhibits.
Introduction
Environmental regulations are rarely "free" for the companies they target. As global economies pivot toward net-zero targets, carbon emissions trading schemes (ETS) have emerged as a primary market-based tool for reducing pollution. However, these policies create a significant financial "squeeze" for firms, which must either invest in expensive green technology or purchase emission quotas.
This study investigates a specific corporate response to this pressure: tax avoidance. While previous research has focused on how environmental laws affect innovation or productivity, this paper asks if firms treat tax savings as a "subsidy" to fund their green transition. Understanding this link is crucial for policymakers who want to ensure that environmental gains do not lead to fiscal losses or unintended market distortions.
Methodology
The researchers treated the rollout of carbon emissions trading pilots in seven Chinese provinces and cities (starting in 2013–2014) as a natural experiment. The study utilized firm-level financial data from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database (2008–2016), focusing on industrial firms.
To isolate the effect of the policy, the authors employed:
- Difference-in-Differences (DID): Comparing the change in tax behavior of firms in "pilot" regions against those in "non-pilot" regions.
- Propensity Score Matching (PSM-DID): Matching pilot firms with non-pilot firms of similar characteristics (size, age, leverage) to reduce selection bias.
- DDBTD Metric: A measure of tax avoidance that calculates the difference between accounting profit and taxable income, adjusted to filter out standard earnings management.
Empirical Results
The baseline regression results indicate a statistically significant increase in corporate tax avoidance following the implementation of the ETS. As shown in the regression table below, the coefficients for the ETS variable remain positive and significant across both standard DID and PSM-DID specifications.
To ensure the validity of the DID model, the authors conducted a parallel trend test. The dynamic effect plot demonstrates that prior to the policy (pre_4 to pre_2), there was no significant difference in tax avoidance between the treatment and control groups. However, following the implementation ("current" and beyond), the level of tax avoidance in pilot regions rose significantly.
Mechanisms and Heterogeneity
The Cash Flow Channel
The study identifies the reduction of immediate cash flow and solvency as the primary mechanism. To survive the liquidity crunch caused by compliance costs, firms turn to tax avoidance as a low-cost method to internalize funds.
Institutional and Market Factors
- The SOE Buffer: State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) showed almost no increase in tax avoidance. Their "softer" budget constraints and easier access to bank loans make them less desperate for cash compared to private firms.
- Competition: Firms in highly competitive industries were more likely to avoid taxes. In these sectors, companies cannot easily pass carbon costs onto consumers by raising prices, forcing them to cut tax bills instead.
- Subsidies as a Mitigant: Government subsidies act as a pressure valve. Firms receiving higher subsidies showed significantly lower levels of tax avoidance, suggesting that direct financial support can prevent "green costs" from spilling over into fiscal non-compliance.
Conclusion
While carbon trading is vital for environmental goals, it creates unintended fiscal consequences. The financial strain of compliance drives firms—particularly those without state backing or in competitive markets—to aggressively reduce their tax burden. Policymakers should consider accompanying environmental regulations with targeted financial support or subsidies to mitigate these side effects and ensure a smoother transition to a low-carbon economy.
Summary updated