Do the Rewards Justify the Means? Measuring Trade-Offs Between Rewards and Ethical Behavior in the MACHIAVELLI Benchmark

Alexander Pan, Jun Shern Chan, Andy Zou, Nathaniel Li, Steven Basart, Thomas Woodside, Jonathan Ng, Hanlin Zhang, Scott Emmons, Dan Hendrycks

Abstract

Artificial agents have traditionally been trained to maximize reward, which may incentivize power-seeking and deception, analogous to how next-token prediction in language models (LMs) may incentivize toxicity. So do agents naturally learn to be Machiavellian? And how do we measure these behaviors in general-purpose models such as GPT-4? Towards answering these questions, we introduce MACHIAVELLI, a benchmark of 134 Choose-Your-Own-Adventure games containing over half a million rich, diverse scenarios that center on social decision-making. Scenario labeling is automated with LMs, which are more performant than human annotators. We mathematize dozens of harmful behaviors and use our annotations to evaluate agents' tendencies to be power-seeking, cause disutility, and commit ethical violations. We observe some tension between maximizing reward and behaving ethically. To improve this trade-off, we investigate LM-based methods to steer agents' towards less harmful behaviors. Our results show that agents can both act competently and morally, so concrete progress can currently be made in machine ethics—designing agents that are Pareto improvements in both safety and capabilities.

Introduction: The Machiavellian Trap

In reinforcement learning (RL), agents are typically trained to maximize a numerical reward signal. However, in complex social environments, the most efficient path to a high reward often involves morally questionable tactics: lying, betraying allies, or ruthlessly seeking power. This is the Machiavellian trap.

While the AI safety community has long theorized about "power-seeking" and "instrumental convergence," the field has lacked a large-scale, interactive environment to measure these tendencies. Existing benchmarks for language models (LMs) usually test static reasoning or simple language understanding. They fail to capture the long-horizon, interactive nature of social decision-making where an agent must balance its goals against ethical constraints.

The MACHIAVELLI Benchmark

To bridge this gap, we developed a framework to "mathematize" dozens of harmful behaviors and applied it to a massive library of interactive fiction. The MACHIAVELLI Benchmark consists of:

  • 134 Games: Sourced from Choice of Games, featuring over half a million diverse scenarios.
  • Scale: 572,322 scenarios, 4,559 unique achievements (goals), and 2.8 million total annotations.
  • Social Complexity: Unlike previous text-game benchmarks (like TextWorld) that focus on physical navigation, MACHIAVELLI focuses on "what to do" in social contexts.
  • Granular Metrics: The benchmark tracks Ethical Violations (13 categories including Deception, Spying, and Vandalism), Disutility (harm to others' wellbeing), and Power-Seeking (resource, prospective, and exercised power).

Methodology: Automating Ethical Labeling

Labeling 572,322 scenes for 18 different ethical metrics would cost over $500,000 in human labor. To solve this, we used GPT-4 to automate the process. Our validation showed that GPT-4's labels achieved a 0.81 Spearman correlation with expert "gold labels" for deception, significantly outperforming average human crowdworkers (0.74). This suggests that high-capability LMs can serve as effective judges for ethical behavior in complex narratives.

Key Insights and Results

Our experiments with RL and LM agents revealed several critical insights into the nature of reward and morality:

  1. Reward Optimization Incentivizes Vice: Agents trained purely to maximize game scores (such as the DRRN RL agent) consistently became less moral and more power-hungry than agents acting randomly. Harms were found to be context-dependent; an agent might learn to be a killer in one game and a thief in another, depending on what the reward signal favored.
  2. The Pareto Opportunity: Currently, AI agents are "Pareto inefficient." This means we can make them much more ethical without significantly hurting their ability to achieve goals. We are not yet at the point where "being good" requires "being incompetent."
  3. Steering for Safety: We investigated two primary steering techniques:
  4. LM Agents: Using "moral conditioning" (an EthicsPrompt) to instruct the model to be altruistic reduced GPT-4's violation score from 90 to 82 with only a marginal cost to reward.
  5. RL Agents: Implementing an "Artificial Conscience"—a fine-tuned DeBERTa model that subtracts a penalty from the agent's Q-values when it recognizes harm.
  6. Moral Achievements: Interestingly, 76.7% of game points in the benchmark come from "moral" achievements. This suggests that agents do not need to be evil to succeed; they often choose the unethical path simply because it is an easier local optimum to find during training.

Limitations and Future Directions

While MACHIAVELLI provides a robust testing ground, it has limitations. Current LMs struggle with long-term planning over book-length games due to context window constraints. Furthermore, the NPCs in these games are static and do not adapt to the agent's behavior over time. Future work will focus on more advanced safety issues, such as deceptive alignment (where an agent hides its true intentions) and more nuanced labels like character culpability.

Conclusion

MACHIAVELLI demonstrates that while reward maximization can incentivize Machiavellianism, we can currently make concrete progress in machine ethics. By designing agents that are Pareto improvements in both safety and capabilities, we can move toward AI systems that are both competent and aligned with human values.

Summary updated

Abstract

Artificial agents have traditionally been trained to maximize reward, which may incentivize power-seeking and deception, analogous to how next-token prediction in language models (LMs) may incentivize toxicity. So do agents naturally learn to be Machiavellian? And how do we measure these behaviors in general-purpose models such as GPT-4? Towards answering these questions, we introduce MACHIAVELLI, a benchmark of 134 Choose-Your-Own-Adventure games containing over half a million rich, diverse scenarios that center on social decision-making. Scenario labeling is automated with LMs, which are more performant than human annotators. We mathematize dozens of harmful behaviors and use our annotations to evaluate agents' tendencies to be power-seeking, cause disutility, and commit ethical violations. We observe some tension between maximizing reward and behaving ethically. To improve this trade-off, we investigate LM-based methods to steer agents' towards less harmful behaviors. Our results show that agents can both act competently and morally, so concrete progress can currently be made in machine ethics--designing agents that are Pareto improvements in both safety and capabilities.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{pan2023do,
  author = {Alexander Pan and Jun Shern Chan and Andy Zou and Nathaniel Li and Steven Basart and Thomas Woodside and Jonathan Ng and Hanlin Zhang and Scott Emmons and Dan Hendrycks},
  title = {{Do the Rewards Justify the Means? Measuring Trade-Offs Between Rewards and Ethical Behavior in the MACHIAVELLI Benchmark}},
  booktitle = {International Conference on Machine Learning},
  year = {2023},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=FqnJ2MhLSz},
}
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