Distributed games with jumps: An $α$-potential game approach

Xin Guo, Xinyu Li, Yufei Zhang

Abstract

Motivated by game-theoretic models of crowd motion dynamics, this paper analyzes a broad class of distributed games with jump diffusions within the recently developed $\alpha$-potential game framework. We demonstrate that analyzing the $\alpha$-Nash equilibria reduces to solving a finite-dimensional control problem. Beyond the viscosity and verification characterizations for the general games, we explicitly and in detail examine how spatial population distributions and interaction rules influence the structure of $\alpha$-Nash equilibria in these distributed settings, and in particular for crowd motion games. Our theoretical results are supported by numerical implementations using policy gradient-based algorithms, further demonstrating the computational advantages of the $\alpha$-potential game framework in computing Nash equilibria for general dynamic games.

Introduction

Modeling the collective behavior of multiple agents—such as pedestrians in a terminal, vehicles in traffic, or drones in a swarm—requires a robust mathematical framework that accounts for both individual goals and group interactions. Traditionally, these scenarios are modeled as dynamic games where the objective is to find a Nash Equilibrium (NE). However, as the number of agents ($N$) increases, the computational complexity typically explodes, a phenomenon known as the "curse of dimensionality."

This paper introduces a scalable approach to this problem by focusing on "distributed games" with jump diffusions. In these settings, while agents' physical states evolve independently, their costs are coupled through their relative positions. By leveraging the $\alpha$-potential game framework, the authors demonstrate that finding near-optimal strategies for finite populations can be simplified into a single-player optimization problem, even in the presence of stochastic shocks or "jumps."

The Problem of Complexity and Asymmetry

Standard approaches to multi-agent dynamics often rely on Mean-Field Games (MFG), which assume an infinite number of players to make the mathematics tractable. While powerful, MFGs struggle to capture the nuances of finite groups or asymmetric interactions, where one agent's influence on another is not reciprocal.

Furthermore, real-world dynamics are rarely smooth. They are often subject to sudden shifts—modeled here as jump diffusions. The challenge lies in finding an equilibrium for a finite number of players where the dynamics are discontinuous and the interactions may be lopsided. The authors address this by seeking an $\alpha$-Nash Equilibrium, a state where no player can improve their outcome by more than a small margin, $\alpha$, by changing their strategy alone.

The $\alpha$-Potential Framework

The core innovation of this work is the application of the $\alpha$-potential game framework to distributed settings. Instead of solving $N$ separate, coupled optimization problems, the researchers construct a single "potential function" ($\Phi$). Minimizing this function allows for the identification of the $\alpha$-Nash Equilibrium.

Reduction to Finite Dimensions

A significant theoretical contribution of this paper is the proof that for distributed games, this potential function can be solved using a finite-dimensional Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. Typically, these problems require infinite-dimensional McKean-Vlasov equations. However, because the agents' physical dynamics (their "states") are independent, the coupling occurs only in the cost function. This allows the researchers to decompose the complex multi-player state into a simpler "sensitivity process," making the math significantly more tractable.

Quantifying Asymmetry

The parameter $\alpha$ serves as a rigorous measure of the "distance" from a perfect potential game. The authors derive explicit formulas showing that $\alpha$ depends on the asymmetry of interactions. In a perfectly symmetric "influence graph," $\alpha = 0$. As interactions become more lopsided, $\alpha$ grows, and the paper provides bounds on how this affects the quality of the equilibrium.

Numerical Implementation

To validate the framework, the authors utilized a Policy Gradient algorithm combined with residual neural networks. This deep learning approach allows the system to "learn" optimal strategies by simulating trajectories and updating policies to minimize the potential function. The framework was tested in simulated crowd-motion environments:

  • Aversion Games: Agents start at a common point and must reach a target while minimizing "crowding," modeled via Gaussian kernels.
  • Flocking Games: Agents seek individual targets but prefer to remain close to the group, modeled via quadratic kernels.
  • Jump Robustness: The simulations included "common noise"—stochastic jumps that affect the entire crowd simultaneously. The policy gradient algorithm remained stable even under these abrupt shifts.

Key Results and Insights

The research yielded several critical findings:

  1. Theoretical Guarantees: The authors provided "Verification" and "Viscosity" theorems, ensuring that the simplified potential function approach leads to a valid Nash Equilibrium.
  2. Emergent Behaviors: In 4-player simulations, agents successfully learned complex social behaviors. In aversion scenarios, they took detours to avoid crowding; in flocking scenarios, they aggregated into tight groups before dispersing to individual targets.
  3. Network Topology: The study highlighted how the shape of the social network (e.g., how influence decays over distance) impacts the equilibrium as the population scales.

Conclusion and Future Work

The $\alpha$-potential game framework provides a powerful bridge between multi-agent game theory and single-agent optimal control. While the deep learning implementation faces some scalability challenges as $N$ becomes very large due to the joint state space dimensionality, it offers a significant improvement over traditional methods. Future research will focus on extending these "open-loop" strategies (pre-planned) to "closed-loop" strategies (real-time feedback) and further optimizing neural network architectures for larger agent populations.

Summary updated

Abstract

Motivated by game-theoretic models of crowd motion dynamics, this paper analyzes a broad class of distributed games with jump diffusions within the recently developed $α$-potential game framework. We demonstrate that analyzing the $α$-Nash equilibria reduces to solving a finite-dimensional control problem. Beyond the viscosity and verification characterizations for the general games, we explicitly and in detail examine how spatial population distributions and interaction rules influence the structure of $α$-Nash equilibria in these distributed settings, and in particular for crowd motion games. Our theoretical results are supported by numerical implementations using policy gradient-based algorithms, further demonstrating the computational advantages of the $α$-potential game framework in computing Nash equilibria for general dynamic games.
BibTeX
@misc{guo2025distributed,
  author = {Xin Guo and Xinyu Li and Yufei Zhang},
  title = {{Distributed games with jumps: An $α$-potential game approach}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2508.01929},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.01929},
}
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