Deepfakes: we need to re-think the concept of "real" images

Janis Keuper, Margret Keuper

Introduction

For years, the machine learning community has operated under a simple binary: an image is "real" if it was captured from the physical world and "fake" if it was generated or altered by an algorithm. However, this position paper argues that this definition is dangerously outdated. Modern smartphones no longer simply "take" photos; they "compute" them using complex AI-driven pipelines. Because current deepfake detectors are trained on legacy data, they frequently misidentify modern, legitimate photos as fakes, rendering many existing benchmarks and detection strategies obsolete.

The Problem: "Taking" vs. "Computing"

Over 90% of photos today are captured on smartphones utilizing computational photography. These devices employ neural networks for multi-exposure fusion, burst denoising, and AI-driven upscaling. Technically, these "real" images are algorithmically synthesized in ways remarkably similar to deepfakes. The blind spot in the research community lies in the data: standard "real" datasets like ImageNet or MS-COCO are 10–15 years old. Detectors trained on this "vintage" digital noise are unprepared for the high-tech processing found in a modern iPhone or Pixel.

The Dataset Age Gap

A critical analysis of the field reveals a heavy reliance on aging datasets. While newer collections like LAION-400M exist, the "mean age" of images remains 7–8 years old, with very few samples from post-2020 smartphone models.

Table of 'Real' data sources used in major deepfake detection benchmarks.

As shown in the table above, the vast majority of state-of-the-art (SOTA) detectors rely on a handful of legacy sources. This creates a fundamental disconnect between the training environment and the reality of modern image capture.

The Modern Hardware Disconnect

To quantify this gap, the authors analyzed the EXIF data of the massive Re-LAION 5B dataset. They found a significant drop-off in image samples from the most recent years and a stark lack of representation for the latest smartphone generations.

Analysis of image age and device generation in modern datasets.

This lack of modern data leads to what the authors call the "Lighting Trap." In low-light conditions, smartphones trigger aggressive algorithmic processing (such as Apple’s "Deep Fusion"). To a frequency-based detector, this extra processing makes a legitimate photo appear significantly more "fake."

Key Results and Generalization Failure

The paper's "Proof of Concept" experiments demonstrate a clear failure in generalization:

  • Accuracy Drops: While SOTA detectors achieved nearly 100% accuracy on older datasets, performance tanked when faced with modern smartphone images.
  • The Frequency Flaw: A DCT-based detector saw a 50% drop in accuracy simply because a real image was taken in poor lighting, triggering internal AI enhancements.
  • DIRE Sensitivity: The Diffusion Reconstruction Error (DIRE) method failed to generalize to modern iPhone images even when the images were down-sampled, suggesting that the underlying artifacts of computational photography are being mistaken for generative signatures.

Redefining the "Fake"

The authors argue for a paradigm shift in how we define fakes. We must move away from a technical definition (how an image was made) and toward a semantic definition (why an image was made). If the technical signatures of a "real" iPhone photo and a "fake" generative image are indistinguishable, the intent of the creator becomes the only meaningful metric.

Limitations and Future Outlook

While this study utilized a targeted set of captures from iPhone 13mini and 15Pro models, a larger-scale study across diverse brands is necessary. Furthermore, moving to a semantic definition of fakes is algorithmically challenging. The paper suggests that if technical detection becomes impossible, the industry may need to pivot toward digital watermarking or blockchain-based provenance to verify image authenticity at the source.

Summary updated

Abstract

The wide availability and low usability barrier of modern image generation models has triggered the reasonable fear of criminal misconduct and negative social implications. The machine learning community has been engaging this problem with an extensive series of publications proposing algorithmic solutions for the detection of "fake", e.g. entirely generated or partially manipulated images. While there is undoubtedly some progress towards technical solutions of the problem, we argue that current and prior work is focusing too much on generative algorithms and "fake" data-samples, neglecting a clear definition and data collection of "real" images. The fundamental question "what is a real image?" might appear to be quite philosophical, but our analysis shows that the development and evaluation of basically all current "fake"-detection methods is relying on only a few, quite old low-resolution datasets of "real" images like ImageNet. However, the technology for the acquisition of "real" images, aka taking photos, has drastically evolved over the last decade: Today, over 90% of all photographs are produced by smartphones which typically use algorithms to compute an image from multiple inputs (over time) from multiple sensors. Based on the fact that these image formation algorithms are typically neural network architectures which are closely related to "fake"-image generators, we state the position that today, we need to re-think the concept of "real" images. The purpose of this position paper is to raise the awareness of the current shortcomings in this active field of research and to trigger an open discussion whether the detection of "fake" images is a sound objective at all. At the very least, we need a clear technical definition of "real" images and new benchmark datasets.
BibTeX
@misc{keuper2025deepfakes,
  author = {Janis Keuper and Margret Keuper},
  title = {{Deepfakes: we need to re-think the concept of "real" images}},
  year = {2025},
  eprint = {2509.21864},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.21864},
}
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