Dao Governance: Voting Power, Participation, and Controversy - a Review and an Empirical Analysis

Ferda Özdemir Sönmez, Catherine Mulligan, William J. Knottenbelt, Markus Jungnickel

Abstract

DAOs have emerged as a novel organizational structure, attracting growing interest due to their decentralized, transparent governance, which replaces traditional hierarchies with stakeholder-managed rules codified as smart contracts. Although various governance models exist, comparative research across dimensions remains limited, leaving the literature fragmented and offering little practical guidance for selecting suitable models. This paper critically analyses existing governance mechanisms and their implementation to support the development of more effective DAO models. To address current gaps, we review prior quantitative studies and conduct exploratory data analysis on centralization, participation, and decision controversy. The findings show that reputation and share-based models can mitigate the centralization seen in token-based systems, though all models suffer from low member engagement, suggesting an over reliance on direct democracy. Our analysis can be replicated across platforms and time frames to refine and validate these insights.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{sonmez2025dao,
  author = {Ferda Özdemir Sönmez and Catherine Mulligan and William J. Knottenbelt and Markus Jungnickel},
  title = {{Dao Governance: Voting Power, Participation, and Controversy - a Review and an Empirical Analysis}},
  booktitle = {Distributed},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1145/3777416},
}

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