TL;DR
CRISPR gene drives, designed to spread specific traits through wild populations, are far more invasive than previously thought, even with resistance mechanisms. This study uses mathematical modeling to show that even the least effective gene drives can spread widely, raising concerns about containment for field trials and suggesting their use should be limited to applications like malaria control where widespread spread is the goal.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
The development of CRISPR-based gene drive systems holds immense potential for controlling disease vectors like mosquitoes or eradicating invasive species. However, a significant concern has been the emergence of "drive resistance" – mutations that prevent the gene drive from spreading effectively. Some recent studies suggested that these resistance mechanisms might make gene drives unlikely to invade wild populations. This paper directly addresses this by rigorously testing this assumption using mathematical models, aiming to clarify the actual invasiveness of current gene drive technologies and inform future research and containment strategies.
Methods
The authors employed a combination of deterministic models (assuming infinite populations) and stochastic, finite-population simulations (specifically a Moran-based model) to investigate gene drive dynamics. They modeled three allelic classes: wild-type (W), gene drive (D), and resistant (R). Key parameters explored included:
- Homing efficiency (P): The probability that a drive allele converts a wild-type allele.
- Drive fitness cost (f): The reduction in reproductive rate or increase in death rate for individuals carrying the drive.
- Resistance: Modeled as neutral (no fitness cost) or with varying costs.
- Population structure: Simulations included both well-mixed populations and structured populations with varying migration rates between subpopulations.
- Standing Genetic Variation (SGV): The presence of pre-existing resistant alleles in the population.
- Offspring number distribution: Accounting for species with high reproductive output.
The stochastic simulations were crucial for understanding the behavior of gene drives when introduced at very low frequencies, where random drift plays a significant role.
Datasets
The study primarily relies on empirical data from published CRISPR gene drive studies to inform the parameters used in their models, particularly homing efficiencies. They compiled a table (Appendix 1-table 1) of reported homing efficiencies across various organisms (yeast, fruit flies, mosquitoes) and drive constructs. No new datasets were generated or introduced as benchmarks.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Resistance is not a foolproof containment: While resistance can prevent a gene drive from reaching 100% fixation, it does not prevent the drive from becoming highly invasive and spreading to a significant frequency within a population.
- Low-threshold invasiveness: Even the least effective gene drive systems studied are likely to be highly invasive. A small release of engineered organisms can lead to invasion of the local population.
- Connectivity is key for spread: In structured populations, even very low rates of gene flow (migration) between subpopulations are sufficient to allow a gene drive to spread beyond its initial release site, potentially across large geographical areas.
- Field trial risks: The high invasiveness suggests that contained field trials, even if carefully managed, carry a significant risk of unintended spread to adjacent or even distant populations.
- Targeted applications: The findings strongly suggest that self-propagating gene drives are best suited for applications where widespread invasion is the intended outcome, such as controlling malaria-carrying mosquitoes across entire regions.
Key Results
- High invasion probability: Even with a homing efficiency as low as P=0.15 and a 10% fitness cost, gene drives were predicted to invade and spread to high frequencies in well-mixed populations.
- Escape from containment: In structured populations, a migration rate of 10⁻³ (equivalent to one migration event every two generations) virtually guaranteed escape for moderate drive efficiencies, leading to invasion of multiple subpopulations.
- SGV's limited role: While pre-existing resistance (SGV) linearly decreases peak drive, a very high frequency (over 50%) is required to significantly contain invasion in their conservative model.
- Offspring number impact: For species like mosquitoes, a higher number of offspring per mating effectively reduces the population and release sizes, but this effect can be accounted for by scaling parameters and does not fundamentally alter the invasiveness.
Limitations and Future Work
- Model Simplifications: The models assume neutral resistance (no fitness cost) as a worst-case scenario for containment, but real-world resistance might have fitness costs that could alter dynamics. They also assume no inbreeding depression.
- Specific Drive Architectures: The study focuses on "alteration-type" CRISPR gene drives. Other types, like "suppression drives," might have different dynamics and could self-extinguish locally.
- Ecological Factors: The authors acknowledge that many other factors, such as density dependence, environmental variation, mating incompatibilities, and local ecology, could influence invasiveness and warrant further study.
- Future Directions: The authors emphasize the need for further research into the evolutionary stability of self-exhausting gene drives, developing more robust containment strategies (e.g., "ecological confinement"), and creating sensitive monitoring methods and countermeasures for unwanted spread. They also call for caution in developing gene drives for applications other than those with clear, widespread benefits like malaria control.
Summary updated