Covert channels through branch predictors: a feasibility study

Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry V. Ponomarev, Nael B. Abu-Ghazaleh

Abstract

Covert channels through shared processor resources provide secret communication between malicious processes. In this paper, we introduce a new mechanism for covert communication using the processor branch prediction unit. Specifically, we demonstrate how a trojan and a spy can manipulate the branch prediction tables in a way that creates high-capacity, robust and noise-resilient covert channel. We demonstrate this covert channel on a real hardware platform both in Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT) and single-threaded settings. We also discuss techniques for improving the channel quality and outline possible defenses to protect against this covert channel.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{evtyushkin2015covert,
  author = {Dmitry Evtyushkin and Dmitry V. Ponomarev and Nael B. Abu-Ghazaleh},
  title = {{Covert channels through branch predictors: a feasibility study}},
  booktitle = {HASP@ISCA},
  year = {2015},
  doi = {10.1145/2768566.2768571},
}

Loading related content...

Figure