When a crisis hits, should a company focus on paying its bankers or keeping its assembly lines moving? While we often think of "resiliency" as a universal good, a new NBER working paper by Viral V. Acharya and colleagues reveals a cold financial reality: for many firms, staying solvent means sacrificing the very operational buffers that protect them from supply chain shocks.
TL;DR
Firms face a fundamental trade-off between financial hedging (holding cash to avoid debt default) and operational hedging (investing in inventory and supply chain diversity). When credit risk is high or financing is tight, companies rationally "hollow out" their operational resilience to save cash, leading to higher short-term profit margins (markups) but leaving them dangerously exposed to disruptions like the COVID-19 pandemic.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
In the wake of the pandemic, "just-in-case" inventory and supply chain diversification became the new corporate mantras. However, these strategies are expensive. A firm must decide how to allocate its limited liquid resources between two distinct "default" risks:
- Financial Default: Failing to meet debt obligations to lenders.
- Operational Default: Failing to deliver goods or services to customers.
The authors identify a "maturity mismatch" problem: financial debt often matures before the benefits of long-term operational resilience materialize. If a firm can't easily borrow against its future stability (due to limited "pledgeability"), it must choose one over the other. The paper investigates how financial distress forces firms to abandon operational hedging, and how this choice manifests in their financial statements.
Methods
The researchers employed a two-pronged approach:
- Theoretical Modeling: They developed a model of a competitive, levered firm facing correlated shocks to both cash flow and production capacity. The model predicts that as credit risk increases, firms will cut spending on operational resilience to build a cash buffer.
- Empirical Analysis: To test the model, they used panel regressions to examine the relationship between credit risk (measured by Altman’s Z-score) and "operational spread" (markup). They used two exogenous shocks—the 2008 financial crisis and NBER-designated recessions—to see how sudden tightening of credit affects this relationship.
Datasets
The study draws on several high-quality datasets:
- Compustat (1971–2020): Quarterly data for over 18,000 non-financial, non-utility U.S. firms.
- FactSet Revere: Detailed relationship-level data used to construct a "Supply Chain Hedging" (SCH) index based on the number and geographic diversity of suppliers.
- Bank Lending Shocks: Data from Chodorow-Reich (2014) to identify firms whose specific lenders were hit hardest by the 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse.
Key Insights and Ideas
- The "Markup" Paradox: Traditionally, high markups are seen as a sign of market power. This paper suggests a different driver: cost-cutting in resilience. When a firm stops spending on expensive "spare" capacity or diverse suppliers, its cost of goods sold (CGS) drops, mechanically raising its markup.
- Resilience as a Luxury: Operational hedging is value-increasing only if the firm survives long enough to see the benefit. For a firm on the brink of bankruptcy, spending on a diverse supply chain is a waste of resources; they’d rather have the cash to pay the interest on their debt today.
- Substitution, Not Complements: While previous literature often viewed cash and operational flexibility as working together, this paper shows they become substitutes under financial pressure. Cash becomes the priority, and operational "slack" is the first thing to be cut.
Key Results
- Credit Risk Drives Markups: A one standard deviation increase in a firm’s credit risk (negative Z-score) raises its markup by 7% relative to the sample average. This is driven by a significant decline in the cost of goods sold.
- Recession Amplification: This relationship strengthens during recessions. Firms with high pre-recession credit risk cut operational hedging much more aggressively when the economy soured.
- The 2008 "Exposed Firm" Effect: Firms whose banks were hit by the subprime crisis showed a much stronger positive relationship between credit risk and markups, confirming that the effect is driven by a lack of access to external capital.
- COVID-19 Validation: During the 2020–2021 period, operational hedging (diverse supply chains) significantly boosted stock returns—but only for firms that entered the crisis with low credit risk. For high-risk firms, the "operational default" didn't matter because the "financial default" risk was already dominant.
Limitations and Future Work
The authors acknowledge that their model is a "partial equilibrium" framework, focusing on individual firms. They suggest that future research should look at General Equilibrium effects: if every firm in a production network cuts operational hedging due to credit risk, it could create systemic "resiliency spillovers" that make the entire economy more fragile.
Additionally, while the paper focuses on inventory and supply chain diversity, other forms of operational hedging—like geographic relocation or backup production capacity—could be explored with more granular data.
Summary updated