Cooperative Decision Making of Connected Automated Vehicles at Multi-lane Merging Zone: A Coalitional Game Approach

Peng Hang, Chen Lv, Chao Huang, Yang Xing, Zhongxu Hu

Abstract

To address the safety and efficiency issues of vehicles at multi-lane merging zones, a cooperative decision-making framework is designed for connected automated vehicles (CAVs) using a coalitional game approach. Firstly, a motion prediction module is established based on the simplified single-track vehicle model for enhancing the accuracy and reliability of the decision-making algorithm. Then, the cost function and constraints of the decision making are designed considering multiple performance indexes, i.e. the safety, comfort and efficiency. Besides, in order to realize human-like and personalized smart mobility, different driving characteristics are considered and embedded in the modeling process. Furthermore, four typical coalition models are defined for CAVS at the scenario of a multi-lane merging zone. Then, the coalitional game approach is formulated with model predictive control (MPC) to deal with decision making of CAVs at the defined scenario. Finally, testings are carried out in two cases considering different driving characteristics to evaluate the performance of the developed approach. The testing results show that the proposed coalitional game based method is able to make reasonable decisions and adapt to different driving characteristics for CAVs at the multi-lane merging zone. It guarantees the safety and efficiency of CAVs at the complex dynamic traffic condition, and simultaneously accommodates the objectives of individual vehicles, demonstrating the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed approach.

Introduction

Highway lane merging is a classic bottleneck that causes traffic congestion, reduces efficiency, and increases the risk of collisions. While Connected Automated Vehicles (CAVs) offer a solution through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication, existing control strategies usually fall into two extremes. Centralized controllers optimize the entire traffic flow but force all vehicles to surrender control to a master system, ignoring passenger preferences. Conversely, single-vehicle decision-making prioritizes the individual but degrades overall traffic efficiency and can lead to selfish, unsafe merging behaviors. This paper addresses this gap by proposing a decentralized, cooperative approach for multi-lane merging that respects individual, human-like driving characteristics while still optimizing for system-wide safety and efficiency.

Methodology

The authors model the multi-lane merging scenario as a coalitional game, a type of cooperative game theory where players (vehicles) can form alliances to reduce their individual costs. The framework consists of several key components: motion prediction using a single-track bicycle model, a cost function formulated via Model Predictive Control (MPC), and the integration of personalized driving styles (aggressive, moderate, or conservative).

The proposed cooperative decision-making framework for host and surrounding CAVs.

Coalition Formation

Vehicles dynamically evaluate four types of coalitions: single-player, multi-player, a "grand coalition" (all vehicles cooperating), or a grand coalition with sub-coalitions. Crucially, the system enforces individual rationality: a vehicle will only join a coalition if its allocated cost within the group is less than or equal to its cost of acting alone. This ensures that cooperation is always beneficial for the individual vehicle as well as the system.

Four typical coalition models defined for the multi-lane merging scenario.

Key Insights and Results

  • The "Grand Coalition" is optimal, but not always rational: Mathematically, a grand coalition where all vehicles cooperate minimizes the total cost for the system. However, if vehicles have mismatched driving styles (e.g., one aggressive driver among conservative ones), the aggressive vehicle might suffer a higher individual cost by cooperating. The game-theoretic model allows that vehicle to break away, mimicking real-world human behavior.
  • Dynamic Alliances: Vehicles with similar goals and driving styles can form "sub-coalitions" (e.g., two moderate vehicles merging together) to simplify the game and lower their collective cost, effectively teaming up to navigate the merge.
  • Personalization is Key: By embedding driving characteristics directly into the cost function weights, the framework proves that future autonomous systems don't have to act like rigid, uniform robots. They can exhibit personalized, human-like behaviors while remaining safe and predictable to other connected vehicles.

Performance Evaluation

The algorithm was tested in MATLAB/Simulink environments. In a 3-vehicle scenario, moderate drivers successfully formed a grand coalition, reducing system cost. However, when one vehicle was switched to "aggressive," it rejected the grand coalition because its individual cost would have increased. The system successfully adapted by allowing it to act as a single-player coalition while the others cooperated. In a 5-vehicle scenario, the algorithm managed complex, dynamic splitting and merging of coalitions based on mixed driving styles. The average computational time was just 0.06 to 0.07 seconds per step, demonstrating strong real-time potential.

Conclusion

The proposed coalitional game-based method enables CAVs to make reasonable decisions at multi-lane merging zones while adapting to different driving characteristics. It guarantees safety and efficiency in complex dynamic traffic conditions while accommodating individual vehicle objectives. Future work will expand the model to handle mixed traffic environments where CAVs must interact with non-connected human-driven vehicles.

Summary updated

Abstract

To address the safety and efficiency issues of vehicles at multi-lane merging zones, a cooperative decision-making framework is designed for connected automated vehicles (CAVs) using a coalitional game approach. Firstly, a motion prediction module is established based on the simplified single-track vehicle model for enhancing the accuracy and reliability of the decision-making algorithm. Then, the cost function and constraints of the decision making are designed considering multiple performance indexes, i.e. the safety, comfort and efficiency. Besides, in order to realize human-like and personalized smart mobility, different driving characteristics are considered and embedded in the modeling process. Furthermore, four typical coalition models are defined for CAVS at the scenario of a multi-lane merging zone. Then, the coalitional game approach is formulated with model predictive control (MPC) to deal with decision making of CAVs at the defined scenario. Finally, testings are carried out in two cases considering different driving characteristics to evaluate the performance of the developed approach. The testing results show that the proposed coalitional game based method is able to make reasonable decisions and adapt to different driving characteristics for CAVs at the multi-lane merging zone. It guarantees the safety and efficiency of CAVs at the complex dynamic traffic condition, and simultaneously accommodates the objectives of individual vehicles, demonstrating the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed approach.
BibTeX
@article{hang2022cooperative,
  author = {Peng Hang and Chen Lv and Chao Huang and Yang Xing and Zhongxu Hu},
  title = {{Cooperative Decision Making of Connected Automated Vehicles at Multi-lane Merging Zone: A Coalitional Game Approach}},
  journal = {IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst.},
  year = {2022},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=OwH1B2YL5H},
}
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