Controllable vs. Random: Renewable Generation Competition in a Local Energy Market

Dongwei Zhao, Hao Wang, Jianwei Huang, Xiaojun Lin

Abstract

Renewable energy resources are playing an increasingly important role in serving consumers at the distribution level of power systems. This paper studies a duopoly two-settlement local renewable energy market, in which one energy supplier has controllable generations (with the help of energy storage) while the other supplier has random generations. In the day-ahead energy market, suppliers determine the bidding prices and quantities, and then consumers decide the energy quantity to purchase from each supplier. In the real-time energy market, a supplier gets penalized if he cannot deliver the amount of energy as committed in the day-ahead market. We formulate the interactions between suppliers and consumers in the day-ahead market as a two-stage problem. The two-dimensional bidding strategies (price and quantity) in the day-ahead market together with the penalty in the real-time market increase the complexity of the equilibrium analysis. To address such a challenge, we first derive weakly dominant bidding quantity strategies for both suppliers, and then characterize the corresponding pure and mixed price equilibrium. We demonstrate that the supplier with controllable generations can earn a much higher payoff than the supplier with random generations. In some cases, however, we show the perhaps counterintuitive result that a higher penalty or a higher variance of random generations may increase both suppliers' payoffs.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{zhao2019controllable,
  author = {Dongwei Zhao and Hao Wang and Jianwei Huang and Xiaojun Lin},
  title = {{Controllable vs. Random: Renewable Generation Competition in a Local Energy Market}},
  booktitle = {ICC},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.1109/icc.2019.8761733},
}

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