Computing the Leakage of Information-Hiding Systems
Lists
Only you see this
Abstract
We address the problem of computing the information leakage of a system in an efficient way. We propose two methods: one based on reducing the problem to reachability, and the other based on techniques from quantitative counterexample generation. The second approach can be used either for exact or approximate computation, and provides feedback for debugging. These methods can be applied also in the case in which the input distribution is unknown. We then consider the interactive case and we point out that the definition of associated channel proposed in literature is not sound. We show however that the leakage can still be defined consistently, and that our methods extend smoothly.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{andres2010computing,
author = {Miguel E. Andrés and Catuscia Palamidessi and Peter van Rossum and Geoffrey Smith},
title = {{Computing the Leakage of Information-Hiding Systems}},
booktitle = {Tacas},
year = {2010},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-12002-2\_32},
}| Probability of Error in Information-Hiding Protocols | Csf · 2007 |
| On the Compositionality of Quantitative Information Flow | arXiv · 2016 |
| Compositional Methods for Information-Hiding | Fossacs · 2008 |
| On the Bayes risk in information-hiding protocols | J. Comput. Secur · 2008 |
| Leakage and Protocol Composition in a Game-Theoretic Perspective | arXiv · 2018 |
| Entropy and Attack Models in Information Flow - (Invited Talk) | Ifip tcs · 2010 |