Computing optimal taxes in atomic congestion games

Rahul Chandan, Dario Paccagnan, Bryce L. Ferguson, Jason R. Marden

Abstract

When the performance of a system is dictated by the behaviour of its users, self-interested choices can result in sub-optimal system operation, as is the case in road traffic networks. The inefficiency resulting from such selfish behaviour is commonly measured by the ratio between the emergent worst-case system cost and the minimum system cost, termed price-of-anarchy. As the degree of inefficiency can be significant even for relatively simple systems (e.g., affine congestion games), researchers have proposed a variety of approaches to align the emergent selfish behaviour with the desired system objective. A well-studied and promising method is that of altering users' perceived costs by means of taxes.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{chandan2019computing,
  author = {Rahul Chandan and Dario Paccagnan and Bryce L. Ferguson and Jason R. Marden},
  title = {{Computing optimal taxes in atomic congestion games}},
  booktitle = {NetEcon@SIGMETRICS},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.1145/3338506.3340239},
}

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