Abstract
Game as a Service (GaaS) has recently been deployed to cope with the limitations of user devices such as storage, computing power, and energy. While the pricing schemes implemented by providers are often simple flat-rates, the consequences of price levels and offer contents on demand repartition are complex. This paper introduces a model for the interactions among competing network providers offering GaaS solutions to study their competition in terms of prices and selection of games. We illustrate the trade-offs network providers face between the attractiveness of a game and its incurred infrastructure costs.
The Strategic Shift to Cloud Gaming
As gaming shifts toward cloud-based models, the heavy lifting of computation moves from the user's device to the cloud. This transition creates a massive dependency on the Network Provider (NP) to deliver low-latency, high-bandwidth streams. In this landscape, NPs are no longer just "dumb pipes"; they are becoming service aggregators that must compete for subscribers.
The core strategic challenge for an NP is deciding which games to include in their "flat-rate" packages and how to price those packages. Adding a popular game increases a provider's attractiveness but also raises operational costs, as they must pay Cloud Providers for the necessary capacity.
Modeling the Competitive Game
The authors propose a two-stage sequential game to analyze this environment:
- Stage 1 (Offer Composition): Providers choose which games from a total set to include in their bundle.
- Stage 2 (Pricing): Once bundles are set, providers compete on price using a modified linear demand model.
A key innovation in this model is the Attractiveness Factor. Unlike standard models that only look at price, this model accounts for the specific set of games offered. It includes a "monopoly effect"—if a provider is the only one offering a specific game, their attractiveness increases significantly. Furthermore, the model calculates the capacity an NP needs based on Conditional Popularity, preventing the over-estimation of costs when users have overlapping interests in multiple games within a bundle.
Key Insights and Market Dynamics
Numerical simulations and a case study involving two competing NPs and two games reveal several critical dynamics:
- The "Bigger is Better" Heuristic: If two providers face similar capacity costs, the dominant strategy is usually to offer as large a game library as possible. The increase in subscriber attractiveness generally outweighs the marginal increase in capacity costs.
- The Power of Exclusive Content: Even a niche game can be a powerful tool if it is exclusive, creating a "monopoly" draw that can offset a slightly higher subscription price.
- Asymmetric Costs Drive Specialization: If one NP has a strategic partnership (lower cost) for a specific game, the competitor may be forced to drop that game entirely to avoid a pricing war they cannot win, leading to market differentiation.
The study confirms that while content selection doesn't change the fundamental math of the pricing game, it shifts the starting point of the competition. In scenarios where one provider has a cost advantage for a specific title, the equilibrium often results in asymmetric offerings, where cost structures dictate what content actually reaches the consumer.
Limitations and Future Outlook
While the model provides a robust framework, it assumes static cloud pricing and fixed Quality of Service (QoS). Future research could treat QoS as a strategic variable—where a provider might offer a "budget" stream versus a "premium" low-latency stream. Additionally, moving from aggregated demand to granular user modeling could capture more complex behaviors between "hardcore" and "casual" gamer segments.
Summary updated