Combatting Gerrymandering with Social Choice: The Design of Multi-member Districts

Nikhil Garg, Wes Gurnee, David Rothschild, David B. Shmoys

Abstract

The Fair Representation Act, first introduced in 2017 and reintroduced in 2019 and 2021, would mandate the use of multi-member districts (MMDs) to elect members to the United States House of Representatives, i.e., having fewer, larger districts each with multiple representatives. The bill is supported by good governance organizations such as FairVote; the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2020 released a report advocating states to use multi-member districts - however, "on the condition that they adopt a non-winner-take-all election model." Despite the popular focus on single-member district (SMD) elections, such MMDs have a long history in the United States, especially at the state and local level. In 1962, 41 state legislatures had MMDs, often with winner-take-all models; even today, 10 state legislatures elect representatives for at least one chamber in such a manner. City councils, state parties, and other organizations often adopt more sophisticated techniques, using variations on Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) to elect multiple winners from each of several districts. This paper considers the design of such multi-member districts and, in the process, opens a rich research agenda at the intersection of two well-studied, but hitherto distinct, aspects of the design of representative democracies: redistricting, and social choice for multiple winners. The redistricting literature assumes winnertakes- all in SMDs and, given a fixed set of voters, studies how to divide the voters into districts such that the set of winners across districts satisfies desirable properties (e.g., for a gerrymandering party, maximizing the number of winners belonging to their party; for a neutral rule-maker, devising rules to ensure 'proportionality,' such that the fraction of winners of each party matches the fraction of voters). The social choice literature, on the other hand, considers a single district and studies voting rules (functions from voter rankings to a set of winners) such that the set of winners in that district satisfies similar properties, including proportionality. A map consisting of multiple MMDs (e.g., 30 two-member districts in Arizona) requires both partitioning voters into districts and devising how each district collects and aggregates votes. The challenge cannot be decomposed: drawing districts depends on the social choice function, and the same social choice function has different effects depending on district size and composition.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{garg2022combatting,
  author = {Nikhil Garg and Wes Gurnee and David Rothschild and David B. Shmoys},
  title = {{Combatting Gerrymandering with Social Choice: The Design of Multi-member Districts}},
  booktitle = {EC},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.1145/3490486.3538254},
}
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