Can a mouse lift an elephant? explanation of chinese investment in Malaysia’s East Coast railway construction

Chun‐Yi Lee, Pei May Lee, Zhe Wei LauThe International Islamic University Malaysia Repository (The International Islamic University Malaysia) 2021

Abstract

This project aims to explain two central puzzles: whether Chinese infrastructure diplomacy represents an innovative form of diplomacy beyond traditional economic statecraft, and identifying the key actors involved in the negotiation and renegotiation of the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL). By engaging with Actor-Network Theory (ANT) within the context of state capitalism, this study provides a thorough understanding of the dynamic interactions between various actors—notably during the initial deal under the Najib administration and the subsequent renegotiation under the Mahathir administration. The research identifies the specific roles assumed by actors from both China and Malaysia, contributing a nuanced network analysis to the existing scholarship on fragmented state capitalism.

Introduction: Challenging the Monolithic State

In international relations, scholarship often falls into the trap of treating nations as monolithic blocks—assuming "China" or "Malaysia" acts with a single, unified will. This paper challenges that oversimplification by examining the internal frictions and diverse interests within these states.

Political map of Peninsular Malaysia showing the states involved in the ECRL project.

The East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), a massive infrastructure project funded and built by Chinese interests, serves as the primary case study. The research investigates how Malaysia managed to successfully renegotiate a multibillion-dollar contract after a change in government, revealing the actual leverage held by recipient countries in the "Belt and Road" era.

Methods and Framework

The researchers employ Actor-Network Theory (ANT), a framework that looks at a web of "actants"—including individual politicians, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), government-linked companies (GLCs), and the project contracts themselves. To map this network, the authors conducted:

  • Elite Interviews: Anonymous sessions with informants possessing first-hand knowledge of the ECRL deals.
  • Document Analysis: A deep dive into newspapers, academic commentary, and official speeches to track shifting narratives and technical specifications.

The ECRL Case: From 1.0 to 2.0

The study compares the specifications between two distinct versions of the project: ECRL 1.0 (2016) under the Najib Razak administration and ECRL 2.0 (2019) under the Mahathir Mohamad administration.

Comparison of the ECRL alignment under the BN (original) and PH (renegotiated) plans.

As illustrated in the alignment maps, the renegotiation involved significant structural changes to the rail route. These changes were not merely geographical but reflected a shift in political priorities and economic pragmatism.

Key Insights: Reputation and Sunk Costs

  • The Myth of the Monolith: The interests of the Chinese Government (seeking diplomatic soft power) often diverged from Chinese SOEs (driven by profit). Similarly, Malaysian political goals did not always align with its GLCs.
  • Reputation as Leverage: China agreed to price cuts partly due to sensitivity regarding its global reputation. Avoiding a "debt trap" narrative was essential for the broader success of the Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia.
  • The "Sunk Cost" Anchor: The new Malaysian government did not cancel the project because the termination cost was estimated at RM 21.78 billion (~$5 billion USD). This massive penalty forced both sides to the negotiating table rather than allowing a total collapse.

Results of the Renegotiation

The transition to ECRL 2.0 yielded significant quantitative wins for Malaysia:

  • Cost Reduction: Total construction cost dropped from RM 65.5 billion to RM 44 billion (a 32% reduction).
  • Efficiency: Cost per kilometer was slashed from RM 95.5 million to RM 68.7 million.
  • Local Equity: Local participation in civil works increased from 30% to 40%.
  • Structural Shift: The project moved to a 50:50 joint management structure between Malaysia Rail Link (MRL) and the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC).

Limitations and Future Work

While the study demonstrates how a "mouse" can move an "elephant," it notes that Malaysia’s leverage was bolstered by a sophisticated civil service and a high-profile democratic shift. Future research is needed to determine if these results are generalizable to nations with weaker institutions. Additionally, the long-term viability of the 50:50 joint management structure and its impact on technology transfer remains an open question.

Summary updated

Abstract

This project aims to explain the following two puzzles: firstly, can the Chinese infrastructure diplomacy be seen as innovative diplomacy other than existing economic diplomacy? Secondly, who are the main actors to negotiate and renegotiate the ECRL? In order to answer this part of the puzzle, we will engage with Actor-Network Theory (ANT) with the existing state capitalism network. Using ANT framework, it provides us with a thorough understanding of how the events unfolded through the dynamic interactions of the various actors, notably on the inking of the ECRL deal under Datuk Seri Najib’s administration, and the renegotiation of the deal by the new administration headed by Tun Mahathir. The contribution of our paper is not only to answer whether the Malaysia case can be seen as positive leverage to China’s infrastructure diplomacy but more so, to identify which actor assumed what role in the negotiation process of ECRL. In the existing literature, the scholarship only indicated the fragmented state capitalism in China, but hasn’t yet identified actors from both China and recipient countries and the actors’ functions in the negotiation. To clearly identify and articulate this dynamic network analysis, using ECRL as a case, is our main contribution to the field of the existing scholarship.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{lee2021can,
  author = {Chun‐Yi Lee and Pei May Lee and Zhe Wei Lau},
  title = {{Can a mouse lift an elephant? explanation of chinese investment in Malaysia’s East Coast railway construction}},
  booktitle = {The International Islamic University Malaysia Repository (The International Islamic University Malaysia)},
  year = {2021},
}
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