Building-in biosafety for synthetic biology

Oliver Wright, Guy‐Bart Stan, Tom EllisMicrobiology 2013 · DOI

TL;DR

Synthetic biology promises revolutionary applications, but the potential for engineered microbes to escape and disrupt ecosystems necessitates robust biosafety measures. This review surveys existing and emerging biological containment strategies, emphasizing the need for multiple, layered defenses to prevent horizontal gene transfer and uncontrolled proliferation of genetically modified microbes.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

As synthetic biology moves from the lab to real-world applications, a critical concern is the potential for engineered microorganisms (GMMs) to escape containment and cause unintended ecological consequences. This includes the risk of GMMs outcompeting native species, disrupting habitats, or spreading their engineered genetic material to indigenous organisms through horizontal gene transfer (HGT). While early concerns about recombinant DNA technology were addressed by physical and biological containment, the increasing sophistication and potential for widespread deployment of synthetic biology demand a re-evaluation and enhancement of these safety measures. The paper addresses the gap in practical, readily implementable biosafety mechanisms for current synthetic biology projects.

Methods

This paper is a review and synthesis of existing knowledge, rather than a report of novel experimental work. The authors survey and categorize various biological containment strategies that have been proposed or implemented for synthetic biology. They focus on "dependency devices" that make cell viability or plasmid propagation contingent on specific conditions or host factors. The review categorizes these mechanisms and discusses their strengths, weaknesses, and applicability to current synthetic biology designs. It also touches upon future directions like orthogonal systems and semantic containment.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Layered Defense is Crucial: No single biosafety mechanism is foolproof. The consensus is that multiple, diverse safety devices are necessary to create evolutionary hurdles for GMMs that might attempt to escape containment.
  • Toxin-Antitoxin Systems: A Double-Edged Sword: While useful for plasmid stabilization, toxin-antitoxin systems are prone to mutations that can lead to escape. Their evolutionary instability makes them less ideal as primary containment, though they can contribute to a layered approach.
  • Auxotrophy as a Robust Strategy: Auxotrophic selection, where a GMM is engineered to require a specific nutrient not readily available in the environment, is presented as a more robust containment strategy due to the difficulty of evolving resistance.
  • Horizontal Gene Transfer (HGT) is a Persistent Threat: Even dead GMMs can pose a risk as their DNA can be scavenged by other organisms. Strategies to minimize HGT, such as avoiding antibiotic resistance markers and optimizing vector design, are essential.
  • Short Environmental Retention Times: Mimicking natural microbial lifecycles by designing GMMs with limited lifespans (days to weeks) is a pragmatic approach to minimize long-term ecological impact.
  • The Future is Orthogonal: While current technologies are the focus, the paper highlights the promise of "semantic containment" through orthogonal systems (e.g., altered genetic codes, xeno nucleic acids) as a more fundamental and robust form of biosafety for the future.
  • Physical Containment is Necessary but Not Sufficient: While essential for laboratory and industrial settings, physical containment alone is not a guarantee against escape, especially in field applications.

Key Results

The paper doesn't present quantitative experimental results but rather synthesizes the state-of-the-art in biosafety mechanisms. It provides a comprehensive overview and classification of various biological containment strategies, including:

  • Toxin-antitoxin systems: Type I, II, and III systems are described, with their strengths (e.g., plasmid stabilization) and weaknesses (e.g., mutation susceptibility).
  • Dependency devices: These include kill switches, auxotrophic selection, amber suppression systems, and conditional origins of replication.
  • Other systems: Restriction enzymes, bacteriocins, bacteriophage lytic systems, and essential gene complementation are also discussed.

The "key results" are the insights into the relative effectiveness and limitations of these different approaches, leading to the recommendation for a multi-layered, redundant biosafety strategy.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge several limitations and suggest future directions:

  • Evolutionary Instability: Many current biosafety mechanisms, particularly toxin-antitoxin systems and kill switches, are susceptible to mutations that can lead to escape. This is a significant limitation for long-term containment.
  • Lack of In-Depth Environmental Testing: There is a need for more quantitative data on how GMMs and their containment systems perform in realistic environmental conditions. Current testing is often limited to laboratory settings.
  • Complexity vs. Reliability: While multiple safety devices increase redundancy, increased complexity can also lead to more points of failure. Balancing these factors is crucial.
  • Future Directions:
    • Orthogonal Systems: Developing truly orthogonal genetic systems (e.g., altered genetic codes, xeno nucleic acids) that are fundamentally incompatible with natural biological machinery offers a promising path to robust containment.
  • Semantic Containment: Refactoring genetic material to create "genetic firewalls" that prevent natural organisms from reading or utilizing synthetic DNA.
  • DNA Barcoding/Watermarking: Developing methods to trace synthetic DNA in the environment for monitoring and security.
  • Designing for Out-Competition: Engineering GMMs to be naturally out-competed by native organisms once their specific task is complete.
  • Improved Environmental Data: Generating more quantitative data on GMM performance in diverse environments to better assess and refine biosafety strategies.
  • Engagement with Stakeholders: Researchers need to actively engage with regulators and the public to define acceptable levels of risk and ensure responsible deployment of synthetic biology.

Summary updated

Abstract

As the field of synthetic biology develops, real-world applications are moving from the realms of ideas and laboratory-confined research towards implementation. A pressing concern, particularly with microbial systems, is that self-replicating re-engineered cells may produce undesired consequences if they escape or overwhelm their intended environment. To address this biosafety issue, multiple mechanisms for constraining microbial replication and horizontal gene transfer have been proposed. These include the use of host-construct dependencies such as toxin-antitoxin pairs, conditional plasmid replication or the requirement for a specific metabolite to be present for cellular function. While refactoring of the existing genetic code or tailoring of orthogonal systems, e.g. xeno nucleic acids, offers future promise of more stringent 'firewalls' between natural and synthetic cells, here we focus on what can be achieved using existing technology. The state-of-the-art in designing for biosafety is summarized and general recommendations are made (e.g. short environmental retention times) for current synthetic biology projects to better isolate themselves against potentially negative impacts.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{wright2013building,
  author = {Oliver Wright and Guy‐Bart Stan and Tom Ellis},
  title = {{Building-in biosafety for synthetic biology}},
  booktitle = {Microbiology},
  year = {2013},
  doi = {10.1099/mic.0.066308-0},
}
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