Budget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured Priors

Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Jicheng Li, Chang Wang, Mingwei Yang

TL;DR

This paper investigates how online advertising auctions perform when platforms don't know advertisers' true value distributions (unassured priors) but must enforce budget constraints. The key finding is that a simple "budget-extracting bid-discount first-price auction" can be as robust and achieve the same outcomes as the theoretically optimal Bayesian revenue-optimal auction, suggesting practical platforms can achieve strong results with simpler mechanisms.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In online advertising, advertisers set budgets, and platforms use auction mechanisms to ensure payments stay within these limits. Traditionally, these mechanisms assume the platform knows advertisers' value distributions. However, in reality, platforms have limited information due to privacy concerns and the complexity of advertising. This paper tackles the challenge of designing and analyzing budget-constrained auction mechanisms when the platform has "unassured priors" – meaning it doesn't know advertisers' true value distributions. The goal is to understand how different budget control strategies affect auction outcomes and seller revenue in this realistic, information-limited setting.

Methods

The authors analyze five budget-constrained auction mechanisms: Bayesian Revenue-Optimal Auction (BROA), Bid-Discount First-Price Auction (BDFPA), Pacing First-Price Auction (PFPA), Bid-Discount Second-Price Auction (BDSPA), and Pacing Second-Price Auction (PSPA). They model this as an "unassured prior game" where buyers have private values and budgets, and the seller commits to a mechanism. A core concept introduced is "budget-extracting," where the mechanism parameters are chosen to maximize budget utilization without violating individual rationality. The paper uses game-theoretic analysis, focusing on strategic equivalence (when different mechanisms lead to the same outcomes) and structural properties (how parameters affect revenue and payments). They also introduce a "lifting" technique to handle complex bidding functions.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Simplicity Can Be Optimal: The most striking finding is that a simple "budget-extracting bid-discount first-price auction" (eBDFPA) is strategically equivalent to the complex, theoretically optimal Bayesian Revenue-Optimal Auction (BROA) under unassured priors. This implies platforms don't need overly complex mechanisms to achieve optimal outcomes in this setting.
  • Budget-Extracting is Key: The concept of "budget-extracting" is crucial. It ensures that mechanisms are designed to effectively utilize advertisers' budgets, which is essential for maximizing seller revenue when priors are unknown.
  • First-Price Auctions Shine: The results highlight the robustness and effectiveness of first-price auctions (specifically eBDFPA) in budget-constrained settings with unassured priors, even outperforming some second-price variants in terms of seller revenue when buyers bid truthfully.
  • Strategic Equivalence Bridges Mechanisms: The paper establishes broad strategic equivalence results, showing how different budget-constrained mechanisms relate to each other, especially in symmetric settings. This provides a unified understanding of their behavior.

Key Results

  • Strategic Equivalence: BROA and eBDFPA are strongly strategically equivalent under certain conditions (strictly increasing and differentiable virtual bidding qfs, or inverse Lipschitz continuous bidding and virtual bidding qfs). This means they yield the same set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
  • Symmetric Case Equivalence: In the symmetric case, eBDFPA, ePFPA, eBDSPA, and ePSPA are all weakly strategically equivalent, sharing the same set of possible outcomes.
  • Dominance Relationships (Truthful Bidding): When buyers bid truthfully, eBDFPA dominates BROA and ePSPA. BROA dominates eBDSPA and ePSPA.
  • Structural Properties: The paper characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions for budget-extracting parameters in BDFPA and PFPA, showing that unique budget-extracting parameters often exist and can be computed efficiently.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge several directions for future work:

  • Budget Manipulation: Investigating whether buyers have incentives to misreport their budgets and how this affects strategic equivalence results.
  • Beyond Bayesian: Extending the analysis beyond fully Bayesian assumptions, particularly to contextual environments.
  • Ex-Post Budget Constraints: Exploring mechanisms where budget constraints must hold ex-post, which is more realistic but introduces challenges with anonymity and requires new solution concepts.
  • Learning Behavior: While this paper focuses on a static model, future work could incorporate buyer learning behavior.

Summary updated

Abstract

In today's online advertising markets, it is common for an advertiser to set a long-period budget. Correspondingly, advertising platforms adopt budget control methods to ensure that an advertiser's payment is within her budget. Most budget control methods rely on the value distributions of advertisers. However, the platform hardly learns their true priors due to the complex environment advertisers stand in and privacy issues. Therefore, it is essential to understand how budget control auction mechanisms perform under unassured priors. This work answers this problem from multiple aspects. Specifically, we discuss five budget-constrained parameterized mechanisms: bid-discount/pacing first-price auctions, the Bayesian revenue-optimal auction and bid-discount/pacing second-price auctions. We consider the game among the seller and all buyers induced by these five mechanisms in the stochastic model. We restrict the discussion to efficient mechanisms in which the seller earns buyers' budgets sufficiently, and thus, leads to his high revenue. Our main result shows the strategic equivalence between the Bayesian revenue-optimal mechanism and the efficient bid-discount first-price mechanism. A broad equivalence among all these (efficient) mechanisms is also given in the symmetric case. We further dig into the structural properties of stochastic budget-constrained mechanisms. We characterize sufficient and necessary conditions on the efficient parameter tuple for bid-discount/pacing first-price auctions. Meanwhile, when buyers do not take strategic behaviors, we exploit the dominance relationships of these mechanisms by revealing their intrinsic structures.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{chen2024budget,
  author = {Zhaohua Chen and Xiaotie Deng and Jicheng Li and Chang Wang and Mingwei Yang},
  title = {{Budget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured Priors}},
  booktitle = {The Web Conference},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1145/3589334.3645344},
}
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