Bidding Strategies for Proportional Representation in Advertisement Campaigns

Inbal Livni Navon, Charlotte Peale, Omer Reingold, Judy Hanwen Shen

Abstract

Digital advertising platforms often produce skewed demographic outcomes in job recruitment due to varying market competition across user groups. This paper presents an "autobidder" framework that enables advertisers to achieve proportional representation (Outcome Parity) without requiring changes to the underlying auction mechanisms of major platforms. By formulating the bidding process as a constrained optimization problem and utilizing Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) and rounding techniques, the authors demonstrate that advertisers can maintain high utility while ensuring diverse audience reach. The framework is evaluated using US census data, showing that it outperforms traditional bidding strategies in both fairness and efficiency.

Introduction

When organizations utilize platforms like Facebook or Google for recruitment, they frequently aim to attract a diverse and representative pool of applicants. However, a significant structural hurdle exists: market competition is not uniform across demographic groups. Previous research indicates that it is often more expensive to display ads to women than to men because women are more heavily targeted by high-bidding retail brands.

If a recruiter employs a standard "Bid Parity" strategy—bidding the same amount for every user regardless of their demographic—the platform's auction mechanism will naturally favor the "cheaper" group. This results in a skewed audience that fails to meet diversity goals. While some have suggested redesigning auction systems at the platform level, such changes are complex and unlikely to be implemented by major providers. This paper addresses the problem from the advertiser's perspective, proposing a client-side bidding strategy that guarantees fair outcomes even within existing, unchanged auction environments.

The Framework: From Bid Parity to Outcome Parity

The core contribution of this research is a shift in focus from "equal bids" to "equal outcomes." The authors argue that fairness in recruitment advertising should be defined by Outcome Parity—ensuring the final set of individuals who see or click an ad is representative of the target population—rather than bidding the same amount for every impression.

Methodology

The authors frame the challenge as an optimization problem, utilizing several key technical components:

  • Linear Programming (LP): The auction is modeled as an integer linear program where the objective is to maximize total value (such as clicks or impressions) subject to budget constraints and specific group representation requirements.
  • Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU): To solve the LP efficiently, the authors adapt an algorithmic framework that allows the autobidder to find optimal bidding thresholds for different demographic groups dynamically.
  • Rounding Techniques: Because auctions are discrete (an advertiser either wins or loses), the authors developed randomized and deterministic rounding methods. These ensure that theoretical winning probabilities are translated into real-world bids that satisfy fairness guarantees with high probability.
  • Online Stochastic Optimization: The model is extended to an online setting, allowing the advertiser to "learn" the optimal bidding strategy over time. This approach achieves "sublinear regret," meaning the strategy's performance improves as the campaign progresses.

Experimental Evaluation

The researchers evaluated their algorithms using data adapted from the 2021 American Community Survey (ACS) for individuals in California and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. These datasets provided realistic gender and race distributions across various job sectors, such as "Entertainment" and "Computer/Mathematical" fields.

To simulate real-world competitive dynamics, the researchers applied a 10% "price bump" to the cost-per-click (CPC) for women, reflecting the higher competition from retail advertisers observed in empirical studies.

Key Insights and Results

The Inefficiency of Bid-and-Outcome Parity

A striking finding of the study is the inherent inefficiency of requiring both bid parity and outcome parity. The paper proves that forcing an advertiser to bid equally while demanding a fair outcome can lead to an arbitrarily large decrease in utility. Conversely, allowing bids to vary across groups to "buy" the necessary representation is significantly more efficient.

Performance and Utility Gains

In simulations, the proposed autobidder achieved proportional representation while maintaining significantly higher utility (more total clicks/views) than strategies attempting to enforce both bid and outcome parity. The autobidder consistently outperformed:

  1. Simple Bid Parity: Which failed to reach the more expensive demographic (women).
  2. Bid-and-Outcome Parity: Which proved too expensive and reduced the overall volume of the campaign.

Practical Feasibility

Unlike rigid quota systems that might be impossible to meet under tight budgets, the authors' ratio-based constraints are technically feasible. If a specific goal is unattainable given the budget and market conditions, the algorithm can notify the advertiser, providing transparency that current bidding tools lack.

Conclusion and Future Directions

By implementing fairness at the bidding level, advertisers can take immediate action toward equitable recruitment without waiting for platform-level changes. However, the authors note several areas for future research:

  • Market Equilibrium: The study focuses on a single advertiser. If many advertisers adopt fairness-aware autobidders, it could shift overall market prices (CPC), requiring a study of market equilibrium.
  • Information Accuracy: The model assumes the advertiser has accurate estimates of user demographics and costs, which are often noisy in practice.
  • The Recruitment Pipeline: Advertising is only the first step. Future work should explore how these bidding strategies interact with subsequent stages of hiring, such as resume screening and interviewing, to ensure fairness throughout the entire funnel.

Summary updated

Abstract

Many companies rely on advertising platforms such as Google, Facebook, or Instagram to recruit a large and diverse applicant pool for job openings. Prior works have shown that equitable bidding may not result in equitable outcomes due to heterogeneous levels of competition for different types of individuals. Suggestions have been made to address this problem via revisions to the advertising platform. However, it may be challenging to convince platforms to undergo a costly re-vamp of their system, and in addition it might not offer the flexibility necessary to capture the many types of fairness notions and other constraints that advertisers would like to ensure. Instead, we consider alterations that make no change to the platform mechanism and instead change the bidding strategies used by advertisers. We compare two natural fairness objectives: one in which the advertisers must treat groups equally when bidding in order to achieve a yield with group-parity guarantees, and another in which the bids are not constrained and only the yield must satisfy parity constraints. We show that requiring parity with respect to both bids and yield can result in an arbitrarily large decrease in efficiency compared to requiring equal yield proportions alone. We find that autobidding is a natural way to realize this latter objective and show how existing work in this area can be extended to provide efficient bidding strategies that provide high utility while satisfying group parity constraints as well as deterministic and randomized rounding techniques to uphold these guarantees. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed solutions on data adapted from a real-world employment dataset.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{navon2023bidding,
  author = {Inbal Livni Navon and Charlotte Peale and Omer Reingold and Judy Hanwen Shen},
  title = {{Bidding Strategies for Proportional Representation in Advertisement Campaigns}},
  booktitle = {FORC},
  year = {2023},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=DXRDWRsXpD},
}
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