Bidding Games and Efficient Allocations

Gil Kalai, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new class of games called "bidding games" that extend traditional game theory to model general-sum scenarios with sequential decision-making and resource allocation. The authors prove the existence of a unique, desirable equilibrium called the "Bottom Equilibrium" which guarantees efficient and fair outcomes, particularly in binary games. This framework has implications for designing better bargaining and arbitration mechanisms.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Traditional game theory often deals with zero-sum games or scenarios where players have fixed roles and turns. However, many real-world interactions, like negotiations or resource allocation, involve players with potentially conflicting interests (general-sum) who must strategically bid for resources or turns. Existing models often struggle to guarantee fair and efficient outcomes in such dynamic environments. This paper addresses this gap by introducing a novel framework for "bidding games" that incorporates budgets and sequential bidding, aiming to ensure that the resulting allocations are not only efficient but also fair to all parties involved.

Methods

The authors extend existing game structures by adding bidding phases. They define "bidding games" and introduce the concept of a "pure subgame-perfect equilibrium" (PSPE). A key contribution is proving the existence of at least one PSPE in any bidding game and showing that the set of all PSPEs forms a "meet-semilattice," with a unique minimum element called the "Bottom Equilibrium."

For binary bidding games (where each decision node has at most two choices), they prove that the Bottom Equilibrium possesses several desirable properties: utilities are monotone with respect to budgets, outcomes are Pareto-efficient, and any Pareto-efficient outcome can be achieved for some initial budget. They also develop a polynomial-time algorithm to compute this Bottom Equilibrium. The proofs often rely on induction and careful analysis of budget intervals and bid dynamics.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper focuses on theoretical game modeling and algorithmic development rather than empirical evaluation on specific datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Bidding Games as a General Framework: The paper establishes bidding games as a powerful model for general-sum scenarios with sequential decision-making and resource allocation, extending beyond traditional zero-sum games.
  • The Bottom Equilibrium: The existence of a unique, well-behaved "Bottom Equilibrium" is a significant theoretical result. This equilibrium is shown to be robust and desirable, especially in binary games.
  • Efficiency and Fairness Guarantees: For binary bidding games, the Bottom Equilibrium guarantees Pareto efficiency (no outcome can be improved for one player without harming another) and monotonicity (outcomes generally improve or stay the same as a player's budget increases).
  • Algorithmic Computability: The development of a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the Bottom Equilibrium is a crucial practical contribution, making the theoretical results applicable.
  • Budget Resolution Matters: The paper highlights that "high budget resolution" (where budgets can be divided into very small increments) is important for achieving the desirable properties of the Bottom Equilibrium, particularly Pareto efficiency.

Key Results

  • Existence of PSPE: Every bidding game admits at least one pure subgame-perfect equilibrium (PSPE).
  • Bottom Equilibrium Properties: In binary bidding games with high budget resolution, the Bottom Equilibrium is:
  • Monotone with respect to player budgets.
  • Pareto-optimal (all outcomes are Pareto-efficient).
  • Pareto-surjective (all Pareto-efficient outcomes are attainable for some budget).
  • Algorithmic Complexity: A polynomial-time algorithm is provided to compute the Bottom Equilibrium for binary bidding games.
  • Non-Binary Games: For non-binary games, the desirable properties (monotonicity, Pareto-optimality) are not guaranteed.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Non-Binary Games: The strong results regarding efficiency and fairness are primarily proven for binary bidding games. The paper acknowledges that these properties do not necessarily hold for non-binary games.
  • High Budget Resolution: The proofs for Pareto efficiency and related properties rely on the assumption of "high budget resolution," which can be computationally demanding or conceptually challenging in continuous settings.
  • Continuous Bids: While the paper touches upon continuous bids, the primary focus is on discrete, high-resolution budgets. The behavior of bidding games with continuous bids and inconsistent tie-breaking rules can lead to the absence of equilibria.
  • Future Work: The authors suggest exploring variations of auction rules (e.g., all-pay auctions, Poorman games), extending results to more than two players, investigating the impact of agendas in bargaining, and analyzing games with private information or random elements. They also propose empirical studies to compare theoretical predictions with actual human behavior.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{kalai2015bidding,
  author = {Gil Kalai and Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  title = {{Bidding Games and Efficient Allocations}},
  booktitle = {EC},
  year = {2015},
  doi = {10.1145/2764468.2764526},
}

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