Beliefs about the speaker's reasoning ability influence pragmatic interpretation: Children and adults as speakers

Alexandra Mayn, Jia E. Loy, Vera Demberg

Abstract

The cooperative principle states that communicators expect each other to be cooperative and adhere to rational conversational principles. Do listeners keep track of the reasoning sophistication of the speaker and incorporate it into the inferences they derive? In two experiments, we asked participants to interpret ambiguous messages in the reference game paradigm, which they were told were sent either by another adult or by a 4-year-old child. We found an effect of speaker identity: if sent by an adult, an ambiguous message was much more likely to be interpreted as an implicature, while if sent by a child, it was a lot more likely to be interpreted literally. We also observed substantial individual variability, which points to different beliefs and strategies among our participants. We discuss how these speaker effects can be modeled in the Rational Speech Act framework.

Introduction

In classical linguistics, the "Cooperative Principle" suggests that we expect speakers to be informative and rational. For example, if you ask, "Do you have siblings?" and someone says, "I have a brother," you infer they only have one brother. If they had two, saying "I have a brother" would be under-informative—a violation of the Gricean Maxim of Quantity.

However, do we hold a 4-year-old to the same standard? This research explores whether we use a "one-size-fits-all" model of human communication or if we tailor our interpretations based on who is speaking. By comparing how adults interpret messages attributed to other adults versus 4-year-old children, the authors demonstrate that our "pragmatic" expectations—our ability to read between the lines—are deeply tied to our beliefs about the speaker’s reasoning sophistication.

Methods

The researchers employed a reference game paradigm across two experiments. Participants were shown three objects and received a message intended to identify one of them.

  • Unambiguous Trials: The message only fits one object.
  • Critical (Implicature) Trials: The message is literally true for two objects: the "target" and the "competitor." However, the competitor has a unique label available (e.g., "triangle"), while the target does not (e.g., "square" was an "inexpressible" message). A pragmatic listener should infer the speaker meant the target, reasoning that if they meant the competitor, they would have used the more specific word.
Figure 1: Examples of an unambiguous and an implicature reference game trials.

The key manipulation was speaker identity. Participants were told the messages came from either another adult or a 4-year-old child. Experiment 1 (N=79) used a cover story involving a scientist and an alien, while Experiment 2 (N=160) used photos of a child to make the identity more salient and comparable to the adult condition.

Key Results and Insights

The study revealed a significant "Child Discount": listeners give children a "pragmatic pass."

  • Pragmatic Ratings: In Experiment 1, the average probability assigned to the "correct" pragmatic target was 70.8% for adult speakers versus 57.3% for child speakers. This effect persisted in Experiment 2 with 70.7% (Adult) versus 62.2% (Child).
  • Literal Interpretation: When the speaker was a child, participants were much more likely to interpret the message literally (guessing 50/50 between the two possible objects) rather than drawing a pragmatic inference.
  • Belief-Driven RSA: The authors propose a modified Rational Speech Act (RSA) model where the listener’s interpretation is a mixture of literal and pragmatic possibilities, weighted by the listener's belief in the speaker's rationality.
  • Individual Variability: Not everyone adjusts their model. Some participants acted as "literal listeners" regardless of the speaker, suggesting they either didn't engage in pragmatic reasoning themselves or didn't think the task required it.

Qualitative strategy annotations supported these findings, with participants explicitly mentioning doubts about a child's ability to "think logically" or "make complex decisions" as a reason for their lower target ratings.

Conclusion and Future Work

This research suggests that human language processing involves building speaker-specific models of rationality rather than assuming a universal standard of cooperativity. While the study used artificial constraints (like "inexpressible features"), it opens several avenues for future work:

  1. Bottom-up learning: Can listeners update their model of a speaker's rationality just by observing behavior, without being told their age?
  2. Naturalistic Stimuli: Using audio or video of children and adults to see if paralinguistic cues (like tone of voice) further modulate these pragmatic inferences.
  3. Other Identities: Testing effects of language proficiency (non-native speakers) or clinical conditions on pragmatic interpretation.

By moving beyond idealized models of communication, this work brings us closer to understanding the social-cognitive complexity of everyday conversation.

Summary updated

Abstract

The cooperative principle states that communicators expect each other to be cooperative and adhere to rational conversational principles. Do listeners keep track of the reasoning sophistication of the speaker and incorporate it into the inferences they derive? In two experiments, we asked participants to interpret ambiguous messages in the reference game paradigm, which they were told were sent either by another adult or by a 4-year-old child. We found an effect of speaker identity: if sent by an adult, an ambiguous message was much more likely to be interpreted as an implicature, while if sent by a child, it was a lot more likely to be interpreted literally. We also observed substantial individual variability, which points to different beliefs and strategies among our participants. We discuss how these speaker effects can be modeled in the Rational Speech Act framework.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{mayn2025beliefs,
  author = {Alexandra Mayn and Jia E. Loy and Vera Demberg},
  title = {{Beliefs about the speaker's reasoning ability influence pragmatic interpretation: Children and adults as speakers}},
  booktitle = {Open},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1162/opmi\_a\_00180},
}
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