Introduction
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), or Ranked Choice Voting, is increasingly adopted to mitigate "spoiler" effects and ensure winners possess a broad mandate. While ideally voters rank all candidates, practical constraints often lead jurisdictions to limit rankings to a fixed "ballot length" ($h$), such as the top three or five choices. This truncation is intended to reduce voter fatigue and simplify ballot design.
However, this paper investigates whether such truncation is a neutral administrative choice or a consequential variable. By holding voter preferences constant and varying the allowed ballot length, the authors explore if the IRV algorithm itself produces different winners.
Methodology
The researchers employed a multi-pronged approach:
- Theoretical Analysis: Deriving lower bounds on voter counts needed for multiple winners and constructing sets of rankings where every possible ballot length yields a unique winner.
- Linear Programming (LP): Searching for "pathological" profiles that maximize winner changes using only full ballots.
- Simulation & Empirical Study: Millions of elections were simulated using random and "1-Euclidean" (ideological spectrum) preferences.
- Real-World Data: Analysis of 168 election datasets from PrefLib, including APA presidential elections and local government contests in San Francisco and Glasgow.
Key Findings
The study reveals that ballot length is a powerful "hidden" variable in IRV elections.
The "Anything Goes" Theorem
The authors prove that for $k$ candidates, it is theoretically possible to produce $k-1$ different winners simply by varying the ballot length. For $k > 3$, as few as $2k^2 - 2k$ voters are sufficient to create such a scenario. Even under structured "single-peaked" preferences, the number of potential winners remains significant, at $\Omega(\sqrt{k})$.
Real-World Sensitivity
Empirical analysis of PrefLib data shows these theoretical concerns have practical weight. In 25% of the 168 real-world elections studied, changing the ballot length would have altered the winner. In some cases, the winner "flip-flopped" between different candidates as the allowed length increased.
Simulation Results
In simulated 1-Euclidean elections—often considered the most stable—the probability that the "true" full-ballot winner retains their victory with a short ballot (e.g., $h=3$) falls below 50% once the candidate pool exceeds nine.
Discussion and Future Work
The results suggest that the choice of ballot length is a policy decision that can determine election outcomes. A notable example is the 2009 Burlington Mayoral election, which the authors identify as a "toss-up" at a ballot length of $h=2$, where minor vote shifts could have flipped the result.
A primary limitation of this study is the assumption of sincere truncation: it assumes voters do not change their ranking strategy when faced with a shorter ballot. Future research should investigate strategic behavior under truncation, explore the "margin of victory" sensitivity, and extend this analysis to other voting systems like Borda count or Copeland’s method.
Summary updated