Asymmetric Optical Image Watermarking

Guang Yang

TL;DR

This paper proposes a two-layer image watermarking scheme that uses a simulated optical 4F unit to embed both a publicly verifiable cryptographic signature and a private, key-selective carrier. The system achieves high robustness against common image attacks while ensuring that only the issuer can detect the highly sensitive private layer.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In the age of AI-generated content, proving the provenance of an image is critical. However, most current watermarking systems are "symmetric"—the same secret key is used for both embedding and detection. This presents a major security flaw: if a third party (like a social media platform) is given the key to detect a watermark, they could also use that key to forge it.

While "asymmetric" or public-key watermarking exists, building a system that is both robust to image editing and cryptographically secure is difficult. The authors investigate whether the physics of optical Fourier transforms can be leveraged to create a secure, two-part watermarking architecture.

Methods

The researchers designed a two-layer architecture based on a coherent optical 4F unit, a classic optical setup used for spatial filtering. Although no physical hardware was built, the system was rigorously evaluated using a high-fidelity scalar-diffraction numerical simulation.

Figure 1. Two-layer architecture. Left: the signer is a simulated coherent 4F unit. A Fourier-plane camera reads the magnitudes of the luminance spectrum, and an amplitude spatial light modulator (SLM) writes the targets that carry the Ed25519-signed, content-bound payload (Layer 1). A reference arm with a secret phase hologram adds a key-defined carrier (Layer 2). Right, top: after the channel, anyone with the public key reads Layer 1 and checks the content binding and the signature digitally. Right, middle: only a holder of the optical key can run the correlator that detects Layer 2. Bottom: a payload copied to another image fails the content binding. All optics in this paper are numerical simulation.
  • Layer 1 (Public): This layer carries an Ed25519 digital signature bound to a "sketch" of the image content. It is embedded into the Fourier magnitudes of the image's luminance. Because the layout is public, anyone with the issuer's public key can verify the watermark offline without needing to trust the issuer's own detector.
  • Layer 2 (Private): This is a "key-defined carrier" added via a secret phase hologram in a reference arm of the optical unit. Detection requires a matched-filter correlator and a specific optical key (parameters like wavelength, focal length, and a secret mask seed).
  • Scientific Rigor: To prevent "p-hacking" or over-tuning, the authors used a pre-registered protocol. They fixed all success criteria (thresholds for bit agreement, false acceptance, etc.) in a hashed specification before generating any optical results.

Datasets

  • Evaluation Set: 877 images from the DIV2K dataset, a standard benchmark for image restoration and compression.
  • Negative Set: 40,670 unmarked images from the COCO (Common Objects in Context) dataset were used to test for false positives (false detections).

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Optical Asymmetry: The core "aha moment" is using the 4F unit to separate public verification from private evidence. Layer 1 is designed for robustness, while Layer 2 is designed for extreme sensitivity to the optical key.
  • Content Binding: By signing a compact description of the image pixels (the "content feature"), the authors prevent "copy attacks." If a watermark is copied from a verified image to a different one, the content binding check will fail.
  • Sensitivity as Security: The private layer's extreme sensitivity to physical parameters (like a 1% scale error) means it acts as a strong "issuer-only" proof that is difficult for an adversary to guess or replicate, even if they know the general algorithm.

Key Results

  • High Fidelity: In an ideal setup, the simulated optical signer matched a purely digital pipeline with a relative field error of only $1.7 \times 10^{-15}$.
  • Robustness: Under the public verifier, the watermark survived common attacks (JPEG 50/75/95, WebP, and resizing) with a VERIFIED rate of at least 99.5% (see Figure 2/4).
  • Zero False Positives: The system accepted none of the 40,670 unmarked COCO images, meeting the strict false-acceptance criteria.
  • Key Selectivity: The private layer proved highly selective. Detection dropped to 0% if the auditor's key had a scale mismatch of just 1% or a mask shift of only 1 bin in the Fourier plane.
Figure 2. Raw bit agreement with the embedded codeword after each attack, in the numerical simulation. Shown is the mean over the 877 evaluation images for the digital signer, the ideal optics, and the nominal optics read by the public verifier and by the op- tical verifier, in legend order (conditions: Sec. 5; “scale”: resize). Whiskers reach the worst image.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Simulation Only: The study is entirely numerical. While the simulation models many non-idealities (noise, quantization, misalignment), real-world factors like polarization, stray light, and complex lens aberrations remain unmodeled.
  • Geometric Vulnerability: Because the watermark relies on a global Fourier pattern, it is sensitive to cropping and rotation. The authors note that decoding fails after a rotation of just 3 degrees.
  • Regeneration Attacks: Like most pixel-level watermarks, this system may be vulnerable to "regeneration attacks" where a generative AI model effectively "re-draws" the image, potentially stripping the mark.
  • Future Directions: The obvious next step is physical hardware validation. Additionally, improving the content binding to be more robust against "white-box" steering attacks is a noted area for improvement.

Summary updated

Abstract

Watermark detectors held by a provider cannot be checked by third parties, and a party that can detect a mark can usually also forge it. We study a two-layer image watermark in which the Fourier transform at the core of the pipeline is performed by a coherent optical 4F unit. Layer 1 carries an Ed25519 signature bound to the image content in Fourier magnitudes, so anyone with the public key verifies offline. Layer 2 is a key-defined carrier written by a secret phase hologram and read by a matched-filter correlator. The optics is a scalar-diffraction simulation with finite modulator bits, pixel aperture, pupil, defocus, misalignment, and sensor noise. No hardware is built. All criteria were fixed in a hashed specification before any optical result. The simulated optical signer reproduces the digital pipeline (field error 1.7e-15, bit agreement 99.997%), verifies at least 99.5% of 877 images under each of 8 post-sensor settings, one unattacked, and accepts none of 40,670 unmarked images. The optical carrier is key-selective: the matched key detects it on 99.8% of the unattacked images, and detection falls to 0% under a scale error of 1% and to 0% under a mask shift of 1 bin. Security rests on the signature and the content binding, for which we separate what is provable from what is measured.
BibTeX
@misc{yang2026asymmetric,
  author = {Guang Yang},
  title = {{Asymmetric Optical Image Watermarking}},
  year = {2026},
  eprint = {2611.23350},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.23350},
}
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