Abstract
Deception varies across individuals and social contexts. The present research explored how individual difference measured by social value orientations, and situations, affect deception in moral hypocrisy. In two experiments, participants made allocations between themselves and recipients with an opportunity to deceive recipients where recipients cannot reject their allocations. Experiment 1 demonstrated that proselfs were more deceptive and hypocritical than prosocials by lying to be apparently fair, especially when deception was unrevealed. Experiment 2 showed that proselfs were more concerned about social image in deception in moral hypocrisy than prosocials were. They decreased apparent fairness when deception was revealed and evaluated by a third-party reviewer and increased it when deception was evaluated but unrevealed. These results show that prosocials and proselfs differed in pursuing deception and moral hypocrisy social goals and provide implications for decreasing deception and moral hypocrisy.
Introduction
In social psychology, moral hypocrisy describes the phenomenon where individuals seek to enjoy the benefits of selfish behavior while avoiding the social costs of appearing unfair. While it is well-established that people may lie to enhance their social image, it has been less clear how individual personality traits—specifically Social Value Orientation (SVO)—interact with social pressures to drive this behavior.
This research investigates whether "proself" individuals (those who prioritize their own gains) utilize deception differently than "prosocial" individuals (those who value equity) when presented with an opportunity to appear fair on the surface. Furthermore, it explores how these groups react when their deception might be revealed to a victim or judged by a third party.
Methods
The researchers conducted two experiments utilizing a Modified Dictator Game. In this setup, a "proposer" is given a sum of money (e.g., 14 units) to split with a "recipient" who has no power to reject the offer.
The critical manipulation involves information asymmetry: only the proposer knows the true total amount. They can choose to report the truth or lie about the total to make a small offer appear like a 50/50 split (e.g., claiming the total was 8 and offering 4, while actually keeping 10).
Experimental Design
- Experiment 1 (Revelation): This experiment manipulated whether the recipient would eventually discover the true total amount (Revealed vs. Unrevealed conditions).
- Experiment 2 (Evaluation): This experiment introduced a third-party reviewer who ranked the proposers' fairness, thereby creating explicit "social image" pressure.
- SVO Measurement: Participants were categorized as "Prosocial" or "Proself" using the SVO Slider Task, a standard metric for resource distribution preferences.
The study involved 147 Chinese university students in Experiment 1 (lab-based) and 445 Chinese participants in Experiment 2 (online via Qualtrics).
Key Insights
Strategic Hypocrisy
The data suggests that proselfs are not merely "dishonest"; they are strategically hypocritical. They were significantly more likely to use "Deceptive-Fair" offers (lying to appear fair) than "Honest-Unfair" offers. For these individuals, the image of fairness is a tool leveraged for self-interest.
The "Unrevealed" Incentive
Proselfs' deception rates increased dramatically when they knew the truth would remain hidden (85% in the Unrevealed condition vs. 57% in the Revealed condition in Experiment 1). In contrast, prosocials remained relatively consistent, suggesting their behavior is guided more by internal standards than the risk of external discovery.
Social Image Sensitivity
Experiment 2 highlighted that proselfs are hyper-sensitive to third-party evaluation. When an evaluator was present, proselfs decreased their hypocrisy if they knew they would be caught (to avoid a negative ranking) but increased it if the lie remained hidden from the recipient but visible to the evaluator.
Key Results
- Deception Rates: In Experiment 1, proselfs lied significantly more than prosocials across both conditions. A significant interaction effect showed proselfs lied most in the "Unrevealed" condition ($p = 0.002$).
- Offer Types: Prosocials allocated significantly more actual money to recipients than proselfs ($F = 58.48, p < 0.001$).
- Evaluation Impact: For proselfs, third-party evaluation significantly decreased deception when the truth was revealed ($p = 0.009$), confirming that social image management is a primary motivator for their "fair" behavior.
Discussion and Limitations
While the study provides robust evidence for impression management, the authors note the difficulty in measuring self-deception (lying to maintain one's own self-image) within this framework. Additionally, differences in baseline deception between the lab (Exp 1) and online (Exp 2) settings suggest that the physical presence of a researcher may suppress hypocritical behavior.
Finally, as the study was conducted with Chinese participants, the findings reflect cultural norms regarding "face" and equity. Future research should explore whether these SVO-driven behaviors are universal or vary across different cultural contexts.
Summary updated