Approximately Revenue-Maximizing Auctions for Deliberative Agents

L. Elisa Celis, Anna R. Karlin, Kevin Leyton-Brown, C. Thach Nguyen, David Robert Martin Thompson

Abstract

In many real-world auctions, a bidder does not know her exact value for an item, but can perform a costly deliberation to reduce her uncertainty. Relatively little is known about such deliberative environments, which are fundamentally different from classical auction environments. In this paper, we propose a new approach that allows us to leverage classical revenue-maximization results in deliberative environments. In particular, we use Myerson (1981) to construct the first nontrivial (i.e., dependent on deliberation costs) upper bound on revenue in deliberative auctions. This bound allows us to apply existing results in the classical environment to a deliberative environment. In addition, we show that in many deliberative environments the only optimal dominant-strategy mechanisms take the form of sequential posted-price auctions.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{celis2012approximately,
  author = {L. Elisa Celis and Anna R. Karlin and Kevin Leyton-Brown and C. Thach Nguyen and David Robert Martin Thompson},
  title = {{Approximately Revenue-Maximizing Auctions for Deliberative Agents}},
  booktitle = {AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2012},
  doi = {10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8270},
}

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