Analysis of vulnerabilities in maritime supply chains

Honglu Liu, Zhihong Tian, Anqiang Huang, Zaili YangReliab. Eng. Syst. Saf 2018 · DOI

Introduction

Maritime supply chains are the backbone of global trade, yet they are increasingly susceptible to disruptions ranging from technical failures to deliberate attacks. Traditional risk analysis in shipping often focuses on local components—like a single ship or a specific dock. However, modern supply chains are "complex networks" where a failure at one node can trigger a cascading breakdown across the entire system. This research presents a robust framework for identifying "vulnerable" ports by combining classical network centrality measures with system-wide robustness simulations.

Methodology

The researchers developed a hybrid framework to identify critical vulnerabilities in maritime networks. This approach addresses gaps in current literature where researchers typically use either Social Network Analysis (SNA) centrality measures or robustness simulations, but rarely both. Relying on a single method can leave "hidden" vulnerabilities undetected.

Figure 1: The four-step framework for analyzing maritime network vulnerability.

As shown in Figure 1, the framework consists of four primary steps:

  1. Preparatory Phase: Modeling the shipping network using "Space L" (Graph of Direct Links), where nodes are ports and edges represent consecutive stops.
  2. Basic Statistical Analysis: Calculating degree distributions and node strength to characterize the network's topology.
  3. Topology-driven Analysis: Using the Borda Count method to aggregate rankings from multiple centrality metrics (degree, strength, betweenness, and closeness) into a single importance score.
  4. Implications and Discussions: Simulating node removal to measure the relative drop in network efficiency, identifying ports whose absence causes the most significant breakdown.

Network Topology and the "Suez Gatekeeper"

The study utilized real-world data from Maersk’s Asia-Europe routes (July 2014), encompassing 19 shipping lines and 54 ports. The resulting network visualization highlights the interconnected nature of global shipping and the dominance of specific transit points.

Figure 2: Visualization of the Maersk Asia-Europe shipping network, showing the central role of the Suez Canal.

Statistical analysis revealed that the network follows a power-law distribution, indicating a "scale-free" nature. This means the system is characterized by a few massive hubs and many smaller ports. While this structure makes the network robust against random failures, it remains extremely fragile under targeted attacks on its hubs. The Suez Canal Container Terminal (SCCT) emerged as the undisputed most critical node, acting as the primary bridge between Asian and European clusters.

Vulnerability Assessment and Key Results

The research highlights a critical synergy between centrality metrics and robustness models. While most top-ranked ports were consistent across models (e.g., SCCT, Tanjung Pelepas, Rotterdam), some discrepancies provided deeper insights. For instance, the port of Marsaxlokk ranked significantly higher in the robustness model (4th) than in simple centrality rankings (12th). This is because Marsaxlokk serves as a unique bottleneck for specific routes; its removal isolates entire regions, causing a massive drop in global efficiency that simple centrality metrics might underplay.

Key findings include:

  • Attack Sensitivity: Network efficiency drops to near zero when only 25-50% of the most important nodes are removed via targeted attacks. In contrast, random failures cause a much slower, linear decline.
  • Top Critical Ports: The most vital nodes identified were SCCT (Suez), Tanjung Pelepas, Port Said/Yantian, Marsaxlokk, and Rotterdam.
  • Model Hybridization: The hybrid approach successfully identified vulnerabilities that single-metric analyses might overlook, proving that combining centrality with efficiency drop analysis is necessary for a complete risk profile.

Conclusion

This framework provides a comprehensive tool for maritime stakeholders to assess systemic risk. While the current study is limited by the use of static 2014 data and a lack of specific throughput (TEU) volumes, it serves as a powerful proof-of-concept. Future work should incorporate dynamic, real-time data and actual cargo volumes to provide an even more accurate economic vulnerability map for global supply chains.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{liu2018analysis,
  author = {Honglu Liu and Zhihong Tian and Anqiang Huang and Zaili Yang},
  title = {{Analysis of vulnerabilities in maritime supply chains}},
  journal = {Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ress.2017.09.018},
}
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