Analysis of the Governments Role in the Economic Crisis During the Interwar Period

Yang HuLecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media 2025 · DOI

Abstract

An economic crisis or a financial crisis encompasses a broad variety of undesirable situations that impact the economy, including recession, inflation, and stagflation. Using two examples from the Interwar Period, this paper examines the role of the state and its reactions in response to economic crises. Both economic crises led to high unemployment, social unrest, and mass impoverishment in their respective countries. Similarly, both nations found their way out through strong government interventionism and legislative changes, resulting in greater state control over the market. This paper settles on two major economic crises from the early 20th century, hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic and the Great Depression of the United States, and takes a further look at the causes of these crises, their impacts, and the state's efforts to overcome them. In conclusion, although two economic crises are specifically caused by different reasons under different backgrounds, both of the countries overcome the effects through more similar procedures. In short, both countries increased their government presence and level of interventionism in the economy. Especially in increasing government investments on public projects, such as infrastructure and improvement on social securities, appeared to be the solution for economic crises during the Interwar Period.

Introduction

The Interwar Period (1918–1939) remains one of the most volatile eras in global economic history. It was defined by a fundamental tension between the traditional laissez-faire economic model and the emerging necessity of state intervention. This paper investigates how the "invisible hand" of the market failed during this period and why two ideologically distinct nations—the United States and Germany—arrived at remarkably similar "big government" solutions to prevent total societal collapse.

By bridging the gap between economic theory and historical consequence, this analysis explores how systemic failures, such as overproduction in the U.S. and astronomical war debt in Germany, led to financial ruin and subsequent social upheaval. Ultimately, it argues that state intervention became a structural necessity for long-term capitalist stability.

Methodology

This study employs a comparative historical analysis, synthesizing economic data, legislative history, and social commentary. The analytical framework is built upon three pillars:

  1. The Business Cycle: Utilizing Clément Juglar’s theory (prosperity, crisis, liquidation) to explain the mechanics of the U.S. collapse.
  2. Nash Zero-Sum Equilibrium: Applying game theory to argue that unregulated wealth accumulation eventually stifles the consumption necessary to sustain producers.
  3. Causal Mapping: Linking specific policy failures, such as the U.S. Prohibition, to broader economic impacts like the loss of tax revenue.

The American Experience: Overproduction and the New Deal

The prosperity of the American "Gilded Age" in the 1920s was, in many ways, an illusion. The paper posits that this was a "stationary state" where wealth was not distributed evenly, creating a fragile economy unable to survive a dip in consumption. A significant and often overlooked factor was the 18th Amendment (Prohibition). Beyond its social implications, alcohol taxes had accounted for 40% of federal revenue. Its ban forced the government to implement income taxes, which further drained disposable income and exacerbated the depression.

To combat the resulting mass unemployment and poverty, the U.S. pivoted toward the New Deal. The Works Progress Administration (WPA) became a cornerstone of this intervention, creating 8.5 million jobs. This massive state-led initiative resulted in the construction of 650,000 miles of roads, 125,000 public buildings, and 75,000 bridges. This shift moved the U.S. from a state of impoverishment toward becoming a highly developed and industrialized power.

The German Experience: Hyperinflation and Infrastructure

In contrast to the U.S. market cycle failure, Germany’s crisis was rooted in the aftermath of World War I and the burden of reparations. The Weimar Republic saw the German mark slide from 90 per dollar in 1921 to a staggering 1 trillion per dollar by 1923. Stabilization began with the transition from the paper Mark to the Rentenmark—backed by industrial land rather than gold—and the implementation of the Dawes and Young Plans.

Despite the eventual descent into totalitarianism, Germany’s economic recovery strategy mirrored the U.S. approach: state-led growth. The massive Autobahn project served an identical economic function to the WPA, absorbing the unemployed into the state payroll to jumpstart consumption. By 1941, Germany had completed 2,400 miles of Autobahn, utilizing infrastructure as a primary stimulus to achieve a rapid return to full employment.

Synthesis: The Convergence of Solutions

Despite their different political trajectories, both nations identified state-led investment as the only viable exit strategy. The convergence of these solutions suggests that purely liberal markets lack the boundaries necessary to prevent total collapse during extreme cycles. In both cases, the state stepped in to act as the "employer of last resort," using public works to restore the circular flow of the economy.

Conclusion

The economic crises of the Interwar Period demonstrated that government presence is often the final safeguard against systemic failure. While interventionism solved the immediate crises of the 1930s, it also laid the groundwork for modern debates regarding the welfare state and social safety nets. Future research should examine how these historical precedents influence 21st-century economic policy and the ongoing political polarization surrounding the "righteousness" of state intervention in the modern era.

Summary updated

Abstract

An economic crisis or a financial crisis encompasses a broad variety of undesirable situations that impact the economy, including recession, inflation, and stagflation. Using two examples from the Interwar Period, this paper examines the role of the state and its reactions in response to economic crises. Both economic crises led to high unemployment, social unrest, and mass impoverishment in their respective countries. Similarly, both nations found their way out through strong government interventionism and legislative changes, resulting in greater state control over the market. This paper settles on two major economic crises from the early 20th century, hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic and the Great Depression of the United State, and take a further look at the causes of these crises, their impacts, and the state's efforts to overcome them. In conclusion, although two economic crises are specifically caused by different reasons under different backgrounds, both of the countries overcome the effects through more similar procedures. In short, both countries increased their government presence and level of interventionism in the economy. Especially in increasing government investments on public projects, such as infrastructure and improvement on social securities, appeared to be the solution for economic crises during the Interwar Period
BibTeX
@inproceedings{hu2025analysis,
  author = {Yang Hu},
  title = {{Analysis of the Governments Role in the Economic Crisis During the Interwar Period}},
  booktitle = {Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.54254/2753-7048/2024.20406},
}
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