Abstract
A database-assisted TV white space network can achieve the goal of green cognitive communication by effectively reducing the energy consumption in cognitive communications. The success of such a novel network relies on a proper business model that provides incentives for all parties involved. In this paper, we propose an integrated spectrum and information market for a database-assisted TV white space network, where the geo-location database serves as both the spectrum market platform and the information market platform. We study the interactions among the database, the spectrum licensee, and unlicensed users by modelling the system as a three-stage sequential decision process. Analyzing such a three-stage model is challenging due to the co-existence of both positive and negative network externalities in the information market. Despite this, we characterize how the network externalities affect the equilibrium behaviors of all parties involved. We analytically show that in this integrated market, the licensee can never get a market share more than half. Our numerical results further show that the proposed integrated market can improve the network profit up to 87%, compared with a pure information market.
Introduction
Cognitive radios offer a promising solution to spectrum scarcity by opportunistically utilizing empty TV channels, known as TV white spaces (TVWS). However, the traditional approach of continuous spectrum sensing is energy-intensive, contradicting the objectives of "green" communications. To mitigate this, regulators have introduced geo-location databases that inform devices of available channels.
For these databases to be sustainable, they require viable business models. Previous research has focused on isolated models: spectrum markets, where licensees lease exclusive channels, and information markets, where databases sell quality data about shared channels. This paper proposes an integrated market model that combines these approaches, allowing users to choose between free basic service, paid advanced information for shared channels, or exclusive leased channels.
System Model and Methodology
The proposed framework models the interactions between the database operator, the spectrum licensee, and unlicensed users as a three-stage sequential game:
- Stage I (Commission Negotiation): The database and licensee negotiate a commission fee for the spectrum market platform using Nash bargaining. Two schemes are evaluated: the Revenue Sharing Scheme (RSS) and the Wholesale Pricing Scheme (WPS).
- Stage II (Price Competition): The database and licensee compete by setting prices for advanced information and exclusive spectrum, respectively. This is analyzed as a "Market Share Competition Game" using supermodular game theory to identify a unique pricing equilibrium.
- Stage III (User Behavior): Users select a service based on price and network externalities. The model incorporates negative externalities (congestion on shared channels) and positive externalities (improved database accuracy through crowd-sourced data).
Key Insights and Results
The analysis reveals several critical findings regarding the dynamics of integrated markets:
- Market Share Constraints: It is mathematically proven that the spectrum licensee cannot capture more than 50% of the market share, regardless of pricing strategy.
- The Role of Externalities: The choice between RSS and WPS depends on dominant externalities. If congestion is high, the database prefers RSS while the licensee prefers WPS. Conversely, if positive crowd-sourcing externalities dominate, both parties favor WPS.
- Social Welfare and Profitability: The Revenue Sharing Scheme (RSS) generally yields higher social welfare by reducing competitive friction. Overall, the integrated market improves total network profit by up to 87% compared to a non-cooperative information market and achieves efficiency within 10% of a theoretical monopoly benchmark.
- Energy Efficiency: By replacing active sensing with database queries, the integrated market significantly reduces device energy consumption, supporting green communication goals.
Conclusion and Future Work
This research demonstrates that integrating spectrum and information markets provides a robust incentive structure for TVWS networks. While the model assumes equal bargaining power and infinite spectrum supply, it sets the stage for future explorations into oligopolistic competition involving multiple databases and licensees.
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