An Efficient Broadcast Authentication Scheme with Batch Verification for ADS-B Messages

Haomiao Yang, Hyunsung Kim, Hongwei Li, Eunjun Yoon, Xiaofen Wang, Xuefeng Ding

Introduction

The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system is a cornerstone of modern aviation, allowing aircraft to broadcast their state—including position, velocity, and identity—to ground stations and other aircraft. However, its lack of authentication makes it vulnerable to "ghost aircraft" injection and data spoofing. This paper proposes a security enhancement using Identity-Based Signatures (IBS) with batch verification to secure ADS-B messages without the overhead of traditional digital certificates, ensuring robust security even on low-bandwidth data links.

The ADS-B Security Gap

ADS-B was designed to replace traditional radar, offering higher precision and lower cost. However, the protocol's openness is its greatest weakness. Messages are transmitted in the clear and lack any cryptographic proof of origin, allowing an attacker with a simple radio transmitter to inject false data into air traffic control systems.

Overview of the ADS-B system architecture, illustrating the communication between aircraft, GPS, and ground stations.

Securing this system is difficult due to several unique aviation constraints:

  1. Bandwidth: ADS-B data links, such as the Universal Access Transceiver (UAT), have extremely limited space (approximately 240 bits for payload).
  2. Connectivity: Aircraft cannot easily check a central Certificate Authority (CA) while mid-flight to verify key validity.
  3. Hardware: Avionics often have limited computational power compared to ground-based servers.

Proposed Methodology: Identity-Based Signatures

The authors developed a broadcast authentication scheme based on a modified version of the Kurosawa-Heng Identity-Based Signature (IBS). Unlike traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) where a digital certificate is required to link a public key to an identity, IBS uses the aircraft's unique 24-bit ICAO address as the public key itself. This eliminates the need to transmit bulky certificates over narrow data links.

The proposed Identity-Based Signature (IBS) workflow, showing message signing by the broadcaster and verification by the ground station.

Key technical components include:

  • Batch Verification: In busy airspace, receivers can be flooded with signatures. The authors implemented a mathematical "shortcut" using bilinear pairings that allows a receiver to verify a large group of signatures simultaneously, which is significantly faster than individual verification.
  • Key Evolution: To protect against side-channel attacks where an adversary might leak key information over time, the system evolves private keys across distinct time periods.
  • UAT Integration: The scheme is designed to fit into the "Type 30" message format of the UAT data link, ensuring compatibility with existing standards.

Performance Evaluation

The performance was evaluated using the MIRACL library on an ARMv7 microprocessor, simulating typical avionics hardware. The proposed scheme was compared against the standard Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and the YCK IBS scheme.

  • Efficiency and Scalability: On a 1.44GHz processor, the proposed scheme can verify 29 signatures within a 300ms window. In contrast, ECDSA can only handle 15, and the YCK scheme manages only 3. While a single verification takes about 80ms, batching effectively amortizes this cost across multiple messages.
  • Communication Overhead: The total transmission overhead is lower than ECDSA because the latter requires sending a 125-byte certificate. The proposed IBS signature is only 140 bytes total, making it highly suitable for bandwidth-constrained environments.

Discussion and Future Work

While the scheme successfully addresses the authenticity of ADS-B messages, it does not provide privacy; aircraft can still be tracked via their public IDs. Furthermore, while the study focused on the UAT data link, the authors note that the 1090 MHz Extended Squitter (1090 ES) link is much more congested and would require further optimization. Future work will involve building full-scale simulations to test these authentication methods in dynamic, real-world flight environments.

Summary updated

Abstract

KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems
BibTeX
@article{yang2013efficient,
  author = {Haomiao Yang and Hyunsung Kim and Hongwei Li and Eunjun Yoon and Xiaofen Wang and Xuefeng Ding},
  title = {{An Efficient Broadcast Authentication Scheme with Batch Verification for ADS-B Messages}},
  journal = {KSII Trans. Internet Inf. Syst.},
  year = {2013},
  doi = {10.3837/tiis.2013.10.013},
}
Figure