Addressing Beacon re-identification attacks: quantification and mitigation of privacy risks

Jean Louis Raisaro, Florian Tramèr, Zhanglong Ji, Diyue Bu, Yongan Zhao, W. Knox Carey, David D. Lloyd, Heidi Sofia, Dixie Baker, Paul Flicek, Suyash S. Shringarpure, Carlos D. Bustamante, Shuang Wang, Xiaoqian Jiang, Lucila Ohno-Machado, Haixu Tang, XiaoFeng Wang, Jean-Pierre Hubaux

Abstract

The Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) created the Beacon Project as a means of testing the willingness of data holders to share genetic data in the simplest technical context—a query for the presence of a specified nucleotide at a given position within a chromosome. Each participating site (or “beacon”) is responsible for assuring that genomic data are exposed through the Beacon service only with the permission of the individual to whom the data pertains and in accordance with the GA4GH policy and standards.
BibTeX
@article{raisaro2017addressing,
  author = {Jean Louis Raisaro and Florian Tramèr and Zhanglong Ji and Diyue Bu and Yongan Zhao and W. Knox Carey and David D. Lloyd and Heidi Sofia and Dixie Baker and Paul Flicek and Suyash S. Shringarpure and Carlos D. Bustamante and Shuang Wang and Xiaoqian Jiang and Lucila Ohno-Machado and Haixu Tang and XiaoFeng Wang and Jean-Pierre Hubaux},
  title = {{Addressing Beacon re-identification attacks: quantification and mitigation of privacy risks}},
  journal = {J. Am. Medical Informatics Assoc.},
  year = {2017},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=W_sMxGJ0V4b},
}

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