A User Cooperation Stimulating Strategy Based on Cooperative Game Theory in Cooperative Relay Networks

Fan Jiang, Hui Tian, Ping Zhang

Abstract

This paper investigates the "selfish node" problem in wireless relay networks, where independent nodes are often reluctant to forward data due to the costs of energy and bandwidth. We propose a cooperation stimulation strategy based on the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) from cooperative game theory. By modeling the interaction between a source and a relay as a bargaining game, we derive an optimal reimbursement scheme that maximizes the system's overall utility—defined as bits-per-joule—while ensuring fair payoffs for both participants. Simulation results demonstrate that our strategy effectively incentivizes cooperation, leading to significant efficiency gains over direct transmission.

Introduction

Wireless networks increasingly rely on "cooperative diversity" to enhance signal reliability and coverage. In such systems, nodes act as relays for one another, effectively forming a virtual antenna array. However, in decentralized or commercial environments, nodes are typically rational and selfish, prioritizing their own battery life and bandwidth. Altruism cannot be assumed in these settings. To harness the benefits of cooperation, a mechanism must exist that aligns the interests of individual nodes with the goals of the network. This paper seeks to determine when nodes should cooperate, how much data they should forward, and what constitutes a fair price for the partnership.

System Model

We consider a three-party wireless network consisting of a Source (S), a Relay (R), and a Base Station (BS). The Source intends to transmit data to the BS and can choose to do so directly or by utilizing the Relay. The Relay can allocate a portion of its resources to assist the Source in exchange for a unit reimbursement price, $\mu$, paid by the Source.

Cooperative relay network model illustrating the proportions of data transmitted via direct and cooperative paths.

The efficiency of the transmission is measured using a "bits-per-joule" utility function. This metric quantifies the amount of information successfully delivered per unit of energy consumed, which is critical for energy-constrained wireless devices. The model accounts for two common relaying protocols: Amplify-and-Forward (AF) and Decode-and-Forward (DF).

The Nash Bargaining Strategy

The core of the proposed strategy is the application of the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Unlike non-cooperative games where players seek to maximize their own utility at the expense of others, NBS identifies a "fair" compromise that maximizes the product of the utility gains for all participating parties.

The bargaining process determines two key parameters: the proportion of data handled via cooperation ($m$ and $n$) and the optimal reimbursement price ($\mu^*$). Cooperation is only initiated if it is mutually beneficial, defined by a specific threshold condition ($AC - BD > 0$) derived from channel gains and pricing structures. If this condition is not met—for instance, if the relay is too distant or the channel quality is poor—the nodes rationally opt for direct transmission.

Simulation and Results

To evaluate the strategy, we simulated a network where the BS is at the origin, the Source is fixed at 800 meters, and the Relay moves along the x-axis between 400 and 1400 meters. Standard wireless constants, such as a $10^6$ Hz bandwidth and a path loss exponent of 3.6, were applied.

Comparison of user utilities for cooperation and non-cooperation scenarios in Amplify-and-Forward (AF) mode.

As shown in Figure 5, there is a distinct "all-or-nothing" jump in utility at approximately 640 meters. This represents the point where the bargaining condition is satisfied, and cooperation becomes the rational choice. Beyond this threshold, both the Source and the Relay experience significantly higher utilities compared to the non-cooperative baseline. The results indicate that the optimal strategy for the Source is to request maximum cooperation ($m=1$) while paying the fair price $\mu^*$ determined by the NBS. The strategy proved robust for both AF and DF modes, though the specific effective SNR calculations differ.

Conclusion

The proposed NBS-based strategy provides a mathematically sound framework for stimulating cooperation among selfish nodes in wireless relay networks. By balancing fairness and efficiency, it creates a win-win scenario that enhances overall network performance. While effective in a one-source, one-relay scenario, future work is needed to scale this bargaining logic to multi-node environments and address potential issues such as node honesty and signaling overhead.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{jiang2009user,
  author = {Fan Jiang and Hui Tian and Ping Zhang},
  title = {{A User Cooperation Stimulating Strategy Based on Cooperative Game Theory in Cooperative Relay Networks}},
  journal = {EURASIP J. Wirel. Commun. Netw.},
  year = {2009},
  doi = {10.1155/2009/294942},
}
Figure