A systems approach for eliciting mission-centric security requirements

Bryan T. Carter, Georgios Bakirtzis, Carl R. Elks, Cody Harrison Fleming

This paper, presented at the 2017 IEEE International Systems Conference, proposes a shift in how we secure Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Rather than playing a reactive game of "whack-a-mole" with individual software vulnerabilities, the authors argue for a top-down, mission-centric approach that treats security as a subset of system safety.

TL;DR

The authors introduce a methodology that combines stakeholder elicitation (the "War Room") with Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec) to derive security requirements based on mission success. By focusing on preventing unacceptable mission outcomes rather than just patching component threats, they provide a framework for building more resilient and cost-effective systems.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Traditional security for Cyber-Physical Systems—like drones, autonomous vehicles, or industrial controllers—often borrows too heavily from standard IT security. This "bottom-up" approach focuses on identifying and mitigating threats to individual components. However, in complex, tightly coupled CPS, a security breach is often a safety failure in disguise.

The authors identify three major gaps in current practices:

  1. Mission Agnosticism: Traditional methods don't distinguish between a vulnerability that crashes the system and one that has zero impact on the specific mission at hand.
  2. Late Implementation: Security is often "bolted on" after the design phase, leading to higher costs and lower effectiveness, as illustrated in Figure 1.
  3. The Safety-Security Blur: In the physical world, the line between a malicious hack and a system failure is thin. Both can lead to the same catastrophic physical outcomes.
Decision effectiveness is highest during the early concept and requirements phases, where the ability to impact cost and performance is greatest.

Methods

The proposed methodology consists of two primary phases:

1. The War Room

This is a structured elicitation exercise involving diverse stakeholders: system designers, military commanders, operators, and maintenance technicians. The goal is to define the "Concept of Operations" (ConOps) and identify what constitutes an unacceptable loss for a specific mission. This ensures the security analysis is grounded in real-world operational needs rather than abstract technical threats.

2. STPA-Sec Modeling

The outputs from the War Room are fed into a modified version of STPA-Sec (Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security), which is based on Nancy Leveson’s STAMP model. Instead of looking for "broken" components, STPA-Sec views security as a control problem. The process follows a logical chain:

  • Identify Unacceptable Losses: (e.g., "Loss of the UAV in enemy territory").
  • Identify Hazards: System states that lead to those losses (e.g., "UAV strays into inappropriate area").
  • Analyze Control Actions: Identifying the commands (human or automated) that could lead to these hazards.
  • Derive Constraints: Creating specific requirements to prevent those unsafe control actions.
The workflow starts with stakeholder discussion in the War Room, which then informs the formal STPA-Sec analysis.

Datasets

The paper does not use a large-scale statistical dataset. Instead, it validates the methodology through a qualitative case study of a small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) conducting a tactical reconnaissance mission.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Security is a Safety Problem: In CPS, the ultimate goal of security is to ensure the system continues to provide its expected service (resiliency) and doesn't cause harm (safety).
  • Context is King: A vulnerability that is critical for a strategic reconnaissance drone might be negligible for a small farming drone. A mission-centric approach allows for smarter resource allocation.
  • Traceability: By modeling the system as a hierarchy of control (from mission requirements down to physical servos), analysts can trace how a high-level mission failure might be triggered by a low-level hardware or software manipulation.
A hierarchical controls model for a UAV, showing how mission-level requirements flow down to the physical environment.

Key Results

Using the UAV case study, the authors successfully derived a set of concrete security and safety constraints. For example:

  • Unacceptable Losses: Identified loss of resources (L1), loss of classified info (L2), and loss of control (L3).
  • Hazards: Identified "Absence of information" (H1) and "Loss of control in unacceptable area" (H3).
  • Derived Constraints: One resulting constraint (CA 1.1) specifies that "The mission planner shall clearly define the area of interest to be congruent with or a superset of the area of operations..." to prevent confusion that could lead to a mission-critical hazard.
Table II defines the hazards and their associated losses, providing the foundation for the security requirements.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that this paper focuses on the elicitation of requirements. The current process is largely manual and qualitative.

Future directions include: * Formal Verification: Implementing these derived constraints into a system model and using formal methods to check if they can be violated. * Closing the Loop: Testing specific security and resiliency solutions (like encryption or redundant control loops) to see how effectively they satisfy the mission-centric constraints. * Automation: Developing tools to help organize the vast amount of natural language data generated in the "War Room" into formal models more efficiently.

Summary updated

Abstract

The security of cyber-physical systems is first and foremost a safety problem, yet it is typically handled as a traditional security problem, which means that solutions are based on defending against threats and are often implemented too late. This approach neglects to take into consideration the context in which the system is intended to operate, thus system safety may be compromised. This paper presents a systems-theoretic analysis approach that combines stakeholder perspectives with a modified version of Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) that allows decision-makers to strategically enhance the safety, resilience, and security of a cyber-physical system against potential threats. This methodology allows the capture of vital mission-specific information in a model, which then allows analysts to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in the locations most critical to mission success. We present an overview of the general approach followed by a real example using an unmanned aerial vehicle conducting a reconnaissance mission.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{carter2018systems,
  author = {Bryan T. Carter and Georgios Bakirtzis and Carl R. Elks and Cody Harrison Fleming},
  title = {{A systems approach for eliciting mission-centric security requirements}},
  booktitle = {SysCon},
  year = {2018},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=WXmrT5njkb},
}

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