Abstract: In financial credit networks, prepayments enable a firm to settle its debt obligations ahead of an agreed-upon due date. Prepayments have a transformative impact on the structure of networks, influencing the financial well-being (utility) of individual firms. This study investigates prepayments from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We first establish the computational complexity of finding prepayments that maximize welfare, assuming global coordination among firms in the financial network. Subsequently, our focus shifts to understanding the strategic behavior of individual firms in the presence of prepayments. We introduce a prepayment game where firms strategically make prepayments, delineating the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria and analyzing the price of anarchy (stability) within this game. Recognizing the computational challenges associated with determining Nash equilibria in prepayment games, we use a simulation-based approach, known as empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA). Through EGTA, we are able to find Nash equilibria among a carefully-chosen set of heuristic strategies. By scrutinizing the equilibrium behavior of firms, we outline the characteristics of high-performing strategies for strategic prepayments and establish connections between our empirical and theoretical findings.
Introduction
Financial networks are defined by intricate webs of debt. When a firm fails, it risks triggering a "default contagion," a chain reaction where insolvencies spread through the network, destroying systemic value via default costs such as legal fees and fire sales. Prepayments—settling debts before their formal due date—offer a potential mechanism to mitigate this risk by injecting liquidity into the system before these costs are triggered. However, prepaying involves an immediate loss of liquid assets for the firm. This study explores whether firms can be expected to prepay strategically and whether such behavior benefits the system as a whole.
Computational Complexity and the Insolvency Advantage
A primary theoretical finding of this work is that finding the welfare-maximizing set of prepayments is computationally "hard." Specifically, the authors prove that maximizing total systemic equity through prepayments is NP-complete when default costs exist, a result derived via a reduction from the PARTITION problem.
Despite this complexity, prepayments offer a unique "Insolvency Advantage." In standard clearing processes, an insolvent firm's assets are discounted by default costs (represented by $\alpha$). Because prepayments occur before clearing, they are not subject to this discount. This allows more value to remain within the network, provided the funds circulate through "debt circles"—paths of liabilities that eventually return value to the prepaying firm.
Strategic Prepayment Games
To analyze individual firm behavior, the researchers modeled prepayments as a strategic game with two possible utility functions: Total Assets and Equity.
- Total Assets: In this model, a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) may not exist, leading to potential systemic instability.
- Equity: When firms maximize equity, a PSNE is guaranteed to exist, though the efficiency of these equilibria can vary significantly.
Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis (EGTA)
Because finding Nash equilibria in large-scale networks is computationally intractable, the study utilized Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis (EGTA). By simulating games with nine distinct heuristic strategies (ranging from "do nothing" to "greedy" approaches), the researchers identified which behaviors dominate in equilibrium.
As shown in Figure 5, the most successful strategy was $h_9$, which involves a "solvency check"—a firm only prepays if it will remain solvent afterward. Interestingly, the "No-Op" strategy ($h_1$) also performed strongly, as the immediate cost of prepaying often outweighs the uncertain benefits of circular liquidity.
Key Results and Systemic Efficiency
The empirical results indicate that strategic prepayments generally improve social welfare compared to a baseline where no prepayments occur. This is measured through the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS), as well as their empirical counterparts, the Effect of Anarchy (EoA) and Effect of Stability (EoS).
Figure 6 illustrates that the incentive to prepay is highly sensitive to default costs. As $\alpha$ approaches 1 (meaning default costs decrease), the PoA and PoS converge toward 1.0. This suggests that when defaulting is inexpensive, firms lose the incentive to prepay, preferring to retain their liquidity as long as possible.
Conclusion
While prepayments can effectively halt systemic contagion, their strategic nature introduces complexity and potential inefficiencies. The findings suggest that while simple heuristics like solvency checking can improve outcomes, the computational hardness of global optimization may necessitate regulatory frameworks to coordinate prepayments during financial crises. Future research will explore fractional prepayments and the impact of cooperative behavior among banking coalitions.
Summary updated