A Reputation-Based Contract for Repeated Crowdsensing With Costly Verification

Donya G. Dobakhshari, Parinaz Naghizadeh, Mingyan Liu, Vijay Gupta

Abstract

A system operator asks a group of sensors to exert costly effort to collect accurate measurements of a value of interest over time. At each time, each sensor is asked to report its observation to the operator, and is suitably compensated for the costly effort it exerts. Since both the effort and the observation are private information for the sensor, a naive payment scheme which compensates the sensor based only on its self-reported values of the effort and the measurements will lead to both shirking and falsification of outcomes by the sensor. In this paper, we design an appropriate compensation scheme to incentivize the sensors to both exert costly effort and then reveal the resulting observation truthfully. To this end, we formulate the problem as a repeated game and propose a compensation scheme that employs stochastic verification by the operator coupled with an algorithm to assign a reputation to each sensor. By including the history of the behavior exerted by the sensor in determining present payments, we show that the operator can incentivize higher effort as well as more frequent truthtelling by the sensors.

Introduction

In the evolving landscape of the Internet of Things (IoT) and crowdsensing, a central challenge is ensuring the reliability of data provided by autonomous agents. These sensors often face a trade-off between exerting effort (which consumes resources like battery life) and reporting accurate data. This creates a classic economic conflict: moral hazard, where the operator cannot observe the sensor's effort, and adverse selection, where the true accuracy of a report is hidden. While verification can resolve these issues, it is often prohibitively expensive. This paper addresses this "lazy sensor" problem by designing a reputation-based contract within a repeated game framework.

Methods

The proposed solution centers on a repeated game (specifically analyzed in a two-stage interaction) where the operator uses stochastic verification and a weighted reputation function. Instead of verifying every report, the operator checks the sensor with a probability $p$. A sensor's reputation $R$ evolves over time, and current payments are calculated as a weighted average of current performance and historical reputation.

The strategic interaction between the sensor and the operator is modeled as a stage game. The payoffs for various strategy combinations—Truthful (T) or Not Truthful (NT) for the sensor, and Verify (V) or Not Verify (NV) for the operator—are detailed in the following matrix:

Table 1: Payoff matrix for the stage game between the sensor (rows) and the operator (columns).

In this model, $x_k$ represents the effort level, $b$ is the cost per unit of effort, $\gamma$ is a reputation boost for honesty, and $C$ is the cost of verification. By adjusting the reputation weight $\omega$ and the payment scaling factor, the operator can optimize the contract to ensure both Individual Rationality (the sensor finds it profitable to participate) and Incentive Compatibility (the sensor is motivated to be honest).

Key Insights and Results

The analysis demonstrates that the "shadow of the future" — the potential loss of future reputation-based earnings — is a highly effective incentive. This allows the operator to achieve high data quality with significantly lower verification frequency than in one-shot contracts.

Key findings include:

  • Optimal Parameterization: For linear cost models, the optimal reputation boost ($\gamma$) is zero. The operator should instead focus on tuning the payment scaling factor and the weight of history ($\omega$) to target a specific effort level $x^*$.
  • Equilibrium Dynamics: The system tends toward a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium. In this state, the threat of random verification is maintained at a level just sufficient to keep sensor falsification in check, without requiring 100% truthfulness or constant verification.
  • The Profit Paradox: Theorem 2 highlights a critical trade-off: while reputation-based schemes improve sensor behavior, the "premium" paid to maintain the reputation system can sometimes exceed the gains from improved data quality in certain linear models, potentially reducing the operator's total profit.

Discussion and Future Work

While the two-stage linear model provides foundational insights, several avenues for future research remain. Extending the analysis to infinite horizons and non-linear cost functions (e.g., realistic battery discharge curves) would enhance practical applicability. Furthermore, moving beyond a single-sensor model to a multi-sensor environment could enable "cross-verification," where reports are compared against each other to detect lies without needing costly external ground truth. Finally, accounting for noisy or imperfect verification would bring the model closer to real-world deployment scenarios.

Summary updated

Abstract

A system operator asks a group of sensors toexert costly effort to collect accurate measurements of a value of interest over time. At each time, each sensor is asked to report its observation to the operator, and is suitably compensated for the costly effort it exerts. Since both the effort and the observation are private information for the sensor, a naive payment scheme which compensates the sensor based only on its self-reported values of the effort and the measurements will lead to both shirking and falsification of outcomes by the sensor. In this paper, we design an appropriate compensation scheme to incentivize the sensors to both exert costly effort and then reveal the resulting observation truthfully. To this end, we formulate the problem as a repeated game and propose a compensation scheme that employs stochastic verification by the operator coupled with an algorithm to assign a reputation to each sensor. By including the history of the behavior exerted by the sensor in determining present payments, we show that the operator can incentivize higher effort as well as more frequent truthtelling by the sensors.
BibTeX
@article{dobakhshari2017reputation,
  author = {Donya G. Dobakhshari and Parinaz Naghizadeh and Mingyan Liu and Vijay Gupta},
  title = {{A Reputation-Based Contract for Repeated Crowdsensing With Costly Verification}},
  journal = {IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.1109/tsp.2019.2952050},
}
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