Abstract: We aim to determine whether a game-theoretic model between an insurer and a healthcare practice yields a predictive equilibrium that incentivizes either player to deviate from a fee-for-service to capitation payment system. Using United States data from various primary care surveys, we find that non-extreme equilibria (i.e., shares of patients, or shares of patient visits, seen under a fee-for-service payment system) can be derived from a Stackelberg game if insurers award a non-linear bonus to practices based on performance. Overall, both insurers and practices can be incentivized to embrace capitation payments somewhat, but potentially at the expense of practice performance.
Introduction
The United States healthcare system remains caught between two primary payment models: Fee-For-Service (FFS) and Capitation. In an FFS model, providers are reimbursed for every individual test or visit, incentivizing high volume but leaving insurers to bear the financial risk of high costs. Conversely, Capitation involves a fixed fee per patient, incentivizing efficiency and proactive care but shifting financial risk to the medical practice. While there is a broad push toward capitation to lower costs, the transition has been slow. This research explores the strategic interaction between insurers and practices to determine if an incentive structure exists where both systems can stably co-exist.
Modeling the Strategic Interaction
To analyze this dynamic, the relationship is modeled as a Stackelberg game, a strategic framework where a "leader" moves first and a "follower" responds.
- The Insurer (Leader): Determines the fraction of patients ($f_1$) to be covered under the FFS model. The insurer's objective is to minimize total net costs, including hospitalization expenses and practice payouts.
- The Healthcare Practice (Follower): Determines the fraction of patient visits ($f_2$) conducted under the FFS model. The practice aims to maximize its total revenue.
A critical component of this model is the introduction of a non-linear performance-based bonus function ($\phi$). Standard linear models typically result in "extreme" outcomes—either 100% FFS or 100% capitation. To better reflect real-world complexities, the model incorporates non-linearity through two assumptions: physician burnout (where quality of care diminishes superlinearly as FFS visits increase) and patient complexity (where capitation patients are assumed to require more intensive care, modeled via a square-root relationship in performance metrics).
Data and Parameters
The model is grounded in empirical US healthcare data. Key parameters include an average of 2.24 visits per FFS patient versus 3.44 for capitation patients, and FFS revenue per visit of $140.41 compared to capitation revenue per patient of $346.32. Hospitalization costs were benchmarked at $9,954 for FFS patients and $9,861 for capitation patients, reflecting the potential for proactive capitation care to reduce expensive emergency interventions.
Results and the "Penalty Paradox"
Numerical simulations reveal that a stable, non-extreme equilibrium is possible when insurers use specific non-linear bonus structures. For a bonus slope parameter $\alpha \approx 6.82 \times 10^5$, the game reaches a steady state where approximately 95% of patients ($f_1$) and 94% of visits ($f_2$) remain under the FFS model.
A striking finding is the Penalty Paradox. To incentivize a hybrid mix of FFS and capitation, the insurer’s optimal strategy often involves a performance-based penalty rather than a bonus. As seen in Figure 1, the equilibrium occurs near the minimum of the performance-based bonus function $\phi$, which often dips into negative values. In this state, the insurer effectively earns an additional $55,843 annually per practice via these penalties. This suggests that while a stable hybrid system is theoretically achievable, it may be bought at the cost of practice performance and financial penalties for providers.
Conclusion
This research demonstrates that while Fee-For-Service and capitation can co-exist in a stable equilibrium, the "peace" between insurers and practices is fragile. The findings suggest that reaching a middle ground requires insurers to implement non-linear incentives that may ultimately penalize practices for their performance metrics. These results are robust across both single-round and repeated-game scenarios. For policymakers, this highlights that transitioning away from FFS requires careful calibration of incentive structures to ensure that system stability does not come at the undue expense of provider sustainability or quality of care.
Summary updated