A Flash(bot) in the Pan: Measuring Maximal Extractable Value in Private Pools

Ben Weintraub, Christof Ferreira Torres, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Radu State

Abstract

The rise of Ethereum has led to a flourishing decentralized marketplace that has, unfortunately, fallen victim to frontrunning and Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) activities, where savvy participants game transaction orderings within a block for profit. One popular solution to address such behavior is Flashbots, a private pool with infrastructure and design goals aimed at eliminating the negative externalities associated with MEV. While Flashbots has established laudable goals to address MEV behavior, no evidence has been provided to show that these goals are achieved in practice. In this paper, we measure the popularity of Flashbots and evaluate if it is meeting its chartered goals. We find that (1) Flashbots miners account for over 99.9% of the hashing power in the Ethereum network, (2) powerful miners are making more than $2\times$ what they were making prior to using Flashbots, while non-miners' slice of the pie has shrunk commensurately, (3) mining is just as centralized as it was prior to Flashbots with more than 90% of Flashbots blocks coming from just two miners, and (4) while more than 80% of MEV extraction in Ethereum is happening through Flashbots, 13.2% is coming from other private pools.

Introduction

In the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem, the order of transactions matters. "Maximal Extractable Value" (MEV) refers to the profit that miners or specialized traders (searchers) can extract by strategically reordering, including, or excluding transactions within a block. While MEV is a natural byproduct of blockchain architecture, it often results in "negative externalities": network congestion, spiked gas fees for ordinary users, and potential threats to consensus stability.

Flashbots was introduced as a private transaction pool and auction mechanism designed to move these activities off-chain. By creating a private channel between searchers and miners, Flashbots aimed to achieve three core pillars: Illumination (making MEV transparent), Democratization (opening MEV access to all), and Distribution (sharing benefits across the ecosystem). This study provides the first independent audit to determine if these goals are being met.

Methodology

To evaluate the impact of Flashbots, we analyzed Ethereum blockchain data spanning from block 10,000,000 to 14,444,725 (May 2020 to March 2022). Our approach combined several data streams:

  • On-chain Analysis: We utilized an Ethereum Archive Node to identify 4.5 million MEV extractions using heuristics for sandwich attacks, arbitrage, and liquidations.
  • Mempool Comparison: By comparing a corpus of 125 million public pending transactions against mined blocks, we identified transactions that bypassed the public mempool via private channels.
  • Flashbots API: We integrated public data on bundles and blocks specifically mined through the Flashbots relay.
  • Profit Normalization: Using the CoinGecko API, we converted all gains and "tips" (coinbase transfers) into Ether (ETH) to calculate the net "insertion profit" for both miners and searchers.

The Rise of the Private Pool

Our findings reveal that Flashbots adoption was near-instantaneous and total. Within eight months of its launch, Flashbots captured 99.9% of the Ethereum hashing power. It has transitioned from an experimental alternative to a de facto component of the Ethereum protocol.

However, Flashbots is not the only private channel. We found that approximately 13.2% of MEV extraction occurs through other private pools or solo mining operations. This suggests that while Flashbots is dominant, a fragmented and opaque "stealth" landscape persists alongside it.

Key Insights: Winners and Losers

1. The Centralization Paradox

Despite the goal of democratization, the Flashbots ecosystem exhibits extreme centralization. Our data shows that more than 90% of Flashbots blocks are produced by just two mining pools: F2Pool and Flexpool. Rather than leveling the playing field, the private auction mechanism appears to have consolidated power within the hands of the largest infrastructure providers.

2. Profit Redistribution

Flashbots has fundamentally altered the economics of MEV. Before Flashbots, searchers (the traders identifying opportunities) retained a larger share of the profits. Under the Flashbots auction model, the balance has shifted dramatically toward miners:

  • Miners: Profits increased by 260% compared to pre-Flashbots levels.
  • Searchers: Profits plummeted by over 84%.
  • Risk: Approximately 1.58% of MEV attempts via Flashbots actually resulted in a net loss for the searcher, often due to smart contract errors or rapid market shifts.

3. Gas Price Relief

One area where Flashbots has clearly succeeded is in reducing network-wide negative externalities. By moving MEV bidding to a private auction, the system has successfully decoupled MEV competition from public gas prices. This has effectively lowered the "MEV tax" on regular users who previously suffered from high fees during periods of intense arbitrage competition.

Conclusion

While Flashbots has successfully "illuminated" a significant portion of MEV and protected the public mempool from gas price spikes, it has struggled to meet its goals of democratization and fair distribution. The system has facilitated a massive wealth transfer from independent searchers to a highly centralized group of miners.

As Ethereum moves into the post-Merge era of Proof-of-Stake, the dynamics of MEV-Boost and validator centralization will require ongoing scrutiny. The current sealed-bid auction model inherently favors the auctioneer (the miner/validator), suggesting that further innovations in auction design are necessary to truly democratize the extraction of value in decentralized networks.

Summary updated

Abstract

The rise of Ethereum has lead to a flourishing decentralized marketplace that has, unfortunately, fallen victim to frontrunning and Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) activities, where savvy participants game transaction orderings within a block for profit. One popular solution to address such behavior is Flashbots, a private pool with infrastructure and design goals aimed at eliminating the negative externalities associated with MEV. While Flashbots has established laudable goals to address MEV behavior, no evidence has been provided to show that these goals are achieved in practice. In this paper, we measure the popularity of Flashbots and evaluate if it is meeting its chartered goals. We find that (1) Flashbots miners account for over 99.9% of the hashing power in the Ethereum network, (2) powerful miners are making more than $2\times$ what they were making prior to using Flashbots, while non-miners' slice of the pie has shrunk commensurately, (3) mining is just as centralized as it was prior to Flashbots with more than 90% of Flashbots blocks coming from just two miners, and (4) while more than 80% of MEV extraction in Ethereum is happening through Flashbots, 13.2% is coming from other private pools.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{weintraub2022flash,
  author = {Ben Weintraub and Christof Ferreira Torres and Cristina Nita-Rotaru and Radu State},
  title = {{A Flash(bot) in the Pan: Measuring Maximal Extractable Value in Private Pools}},
  booktitle = {IMC},
  year = {2022},
  url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=0frhI-o2Kf},
}
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