Abstract
As power systems transition toward high renewable energy (RE) penetration, the inherent variability of sources like wind power poses significant stability challenges. This paper introduces a Power Demand-Supply Cooperative Response (PDSCR) strategy designed to maximize renewable utilization by synchronizing industrial demand with power supply. By employing a two-stage approach—combining day-ahead centralized optimization with intraday decentralized cooperative games—the strategy ensures fair profit distribution among participants. Validation on standard and real-world grid models demonstrates that this cooperative framework effectively mitigates wind power fluctuations, reduces curtailment by nearly 50%, and lowers overall system costs.
Introduction
The transition to a "green" grid is hindered by the unpredictable nature of wind power, which often peaks when demand is low, leading to significant energy wastage or curtailment. Traditional Demand Response (DR) programs, which are typically centralized and top-down, often fail in decentralized markets where participants like industrial factories and utility companies act in their own self-interest. If the financial incentives do not outweigh operational costs, industrial loads will not adjust their production to accommodate renewable surges.
This research addresses the fundamental conflict of interest in decentralized power markets. It proposes a coordination mechanism that ensures all participants benefit financially while simultaneously stabilizing the grid and reducing the carbon footprint of industrial production.
Methodology: The PDSCR Strategy
The authors propose a two-stage strategy termed PDSCR to manage the temporal mismatch between wind supply and industrial demand.
Stage 1: Day-Ahead Centralized Dispatch
In the first stage, a Bi-level Multi-Objective (BMO) optimization model is employed based on Stackelberg game theory. The utility center acts as the "leader," setting electricity prices and scheduling thermal unit commitments. Industrial Production Enterprises (IPEs) act as "followers," optimizing their production schedules in response to these price signals. This stage establishes a baseline for grid operation and pre-dispatches resources based on forecasted wind availability.
Stage 2: Intraday Decentralized Cooperative Response
To handle real-time fluctuations that deviate from day-ahead forecasts, the model shifts to a cooperative game framework. By extending the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) to handle multi-individual, nonlinear utilities, the system allows for real-time adjustments.
A critical component of this stage is the development of Multi-Individual Profit Distribution Marginal Solutions (MIPDMSs). These mathematical frameworks ensure that the "cooperative profit"—the savings generated by working together—is distributed fairly. The authors explored two distribution methods:
- Equal Distribution: Savings are split equally among all participants.
- Contribution-Based Distribution: Participants who provide more flexibility (e.g., those who adjust their power consumption more aggressively) receive a larger share of the savings.
Cooperative Framework and Profit Distribution
The core innovation lies in solving the "fairness factor." If a utility center retains all the savings from reduced curtailment, industrial loads have no incentive to participate in balancing the grid. The cooperative model uses benefit bargaining to reach a state of Pareto efficiency, where no participant can improve their position without making another worse off.
The contribution-based MIPDMS was found to be particularly effective. By rewarding participants based on their actual impact on grid stability, it expands the "feasible region" of profit utility, encouraging more aggressive responses to wind fluctuations than simple equal-sharing models.
Key Results and Insights
The strategy was validated using a modified IEEE 24-bus system and an actual 26-bus system from Yantai, China. Key findings include:
- Significant Curtailment Reduction: In the Yantai system, the cooperative intraday strategy reduced wind curtailment from 3.61 × 10³ MW to 1.86 × 10³ MW—a reduction of nearly 50% compared to standard day-ahead strategies.
- Economic Efficiency: Total system costs dropped significantly. In representative scenarios, costs fell from $5.42 × 10⁵$ to $4.48 × 10⁵$ due to optimized thermal unit usage and reduced reliance on expensive reserve power.
- Grid Flexibility: By linking long-term thermal unit commitment with short-term industrial flexibility, the system creates a robust buffer against the inherent uncertainty of renewable energy.
Conclusion and Future Directions
The PDSCR strategy demonstrates that profit-driven cooperation is more effective at integrating renewable energy than independent, self-interested dispatch. However, real-world implementation faces hurdles. Future research must integrate large-scale battery energy storage systems to provide additional layers of flexibility. Furthermore, as the grid becomes more decentralized and dependent on real-time data exchange, enhancing communication infrastructure and cybersecurity will be paramount to ensuring the resilience of cooperative response models.
Summary updated