A continuum of undetectable timing-attacks on PMU-based linear state-estimation

Sérgio Barreto Andrade, Jean-Yves Le Boudec, Ezzeldin Shereen, György Dán, Marco Pignati, Mario Paolone

Abstract

Recent innovations in protection and control applications for power systems require the use of Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) measurements. PMUs rely on precise time synchronization and have been shown to be vulnerable to time synchronization attacks. In this paper, we explore time synchronization attacks against PMU measurements that are undetectable by state-of-the-art Bad-Data Detection (BDD) algorithms, used for Linear State-Estimation (LSE). We show that compromising three or more PMUs enables an attacker to create a continuum of undetectable attacks, and based on geometric arguments we provide a closed form expression for computing the attacks. Furthermore, we provide an algorithm for identifying PMU measurements that are vulnerable to the considered attacks. We use simulations on the IEEE 39-Bus benchmark power system to show that attacks can have a significant impact in terms of power flow mis-estimation that could lead to the violation of ampacity limits in transmission lines.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{andrade2017continuum,
  author = {Sérgio Barreto Andrade and Jean-Yves Le Boudec and Ezzeldin Shereen and György Dán and Marco Pignati and Mario Paolone},
  title = {{A continuum of undetectable timing-attacks on PMU-based linear state-estimation}},
  booktitle = {Smartgridcomm},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.1109/smartgridcomm.2017.8340673},
}

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