ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur 2004
Top Research Directions
The 3 research directions with ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur 2004 papers, ranked by paper count. Share is the fraction of the edition’s papers in the direction.
| # | Direction | Papers | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Backward Compatible Upgrades for Distributed Protocols | 1 | 33.3% |
| 2 | Closing the Formal Security Verification Gap | 1 | 33.3% |
| 3 | Scaling Trusted Execution Environments Beyond Hardware Memory Limits | 1 | 33.3% |
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Institutions
Institutions credited by ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur 2004 papers: a paper credits every institution named in its affiliations, once. 1 institutions share 1 credited papers.
| # | Institution | Papers | Share | 2003 | 2003 rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Stanford University | 1 | 100.0% | 0 | — |
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About this data
Papers. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur 2004 lists 3 papers on Lacuna, duplicate versions counted once; rejected and withdrawn submissions are left out.
Directions. Directions are Lacuna’s clustering of the concept elements extracted from each paper, so a paper can belong to several and direction counts add up to more than the paper count. A direction’s share is its papers divided by the edition’s papers.
Institutions. A paper credits each institution named in its affiliations, resolved to a ROR record, once. 1 of 3 papers (33.3%) credit at least one institution and are the base for institution shares; the rest have no resolved affiliation yet.
Data. Counts come from Lacuna’s data build of 2026-11-20 and change as papers are added. Tables as CSV: directions · institutions. Cite as: Lacuna, “ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur 2004”, https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/venue/acm-trans-inf-syst-secur/2004.
Top Authors
| Author | Papers |
|---|---|
| Giuseppe Ateniese | 1 |
Impactful Papers
Papers from ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur 2004 that shaped research clusters.
Foundational
Papers
| Title |
|---|
| Client-side caching for TLS |
| Just fast keying: Key agreement in a hostile internet |
| Verifiable encryption of digital signatures and applications |