ACM Trans. Economics and Comput 2015

29 papers

Top Research Directions

The 12 research directions with ACM Trans. Economics and Comput 2015 papers, ranked by paper count, next to 2014. Share is the fraction of the edition’s papers in the direction.

#Direction20152014Share 2015Share 20142014 rank
1The Computational Intractability of Exact Equilibria206.9%0.0%—
2Average Reward Reinforcement Learning103.4%0.0%—
3From Fractional Solutions to Discrete Decisions103.4%0.0%—
4Graph Neural Networks for Wireless Interference Modeling103.4%0.0%—
5Learning Optimal Auctions from Finite Samples113.4%6.7%5
6Learning Optimal Prices Against Strategic Buyers103.4%0.0%—
7Mechanism Design Beyond the Risk Neutrality Assumption103.4%0.0%—
8Mitigating Node Selfishness in Decentralized Wireless Networks103.4%0.0%—
9Overcoming the Agent Homogeneity Assumption103.4%0.0%—
10Search and Regret Minimization in Information Sets103.4%0.0%—
11Sequential Decision Making under Finite Resource Budgets103.4%0.0%—
12Strategyproof Resource Allocation Without Money103.4%0.0%—

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Institutions

Institutions credited by ACM Trans. Economics and Comput 2015 papers: a paper credits every institution named in its affiliations, once. 22 institutions share 11 credited papers.

#InstitutionPapersShare20142014 rank
1Cornell University 218.2%113
2Microsoft (United States) 218.2%11
3University of California, Berkeley 218.2%14
4University of Pennsylvania 218.2%0—
5051fftw81 19.1%0—
6Aarhus University 19.1%0—
7Boston University 19.1%0—
8California Institute of Technology 19.1%0—
9Carnegie Mellon University 19.1%114
10Czech Technical University in Prague 19.1%0—
11Harvard University 19.1%0—
12Hebrew University of Jerusalem 19.1%110
13IT University of Copenhagen 19.1%0—
14Nanyang Technological University 19.1%0—
15RWTH Aachen University 19.1%0—
16TU Dortmund University 19.1%0—
17University of California, Los Angeles 19.1%0—
18University of Cambridge 19.1%0—
19University of Patras 19.1%0—
20University of Southern California 19.1%0—
21University of Wisconsin–Madison 19.1%0—
22École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne 19.1%0—

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About this data

Papers. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput 2015 lists 29 papers on Lacuna, duplicate versions counted once; rejected and withdrawn submissions are left out.

Directions. Directions are Lacuna’s clustering of the concept elements extracted from each paper, so a paper can belong to several and direction counts add up to more than the paper count. A direction’s share is its papers divided by the edition’s papers. Comparisons with 2014 use shares, since the edition went from 15 to 29 papers.

Institutions. A paper credits each institution named in its affiliations, resolved to a ROR record, once. 11 of 29 papers (37.9%) credit at least one institution and are the base for institution shares; the rest have no resolved affiliation yet.

Data. Counts come from Lacuna’s data build of 2026-11-22 and change as papers are added. Tables as CSV: directions · institutions. Cite as: Lacuna, “ACM Trans. Economics and Comput 2015”, https://lacuna.tiptreesystems.com/venue/acm-trans-economics-and-comput/2015.

Top Authors

AuthorPapers
Monika Henzinger3
Paul Duetting3
Balasubramanian Sivan2
David C. Parkes2
Sergei Vassilvitskii2
Tim Roughgarden2
Aleksandrs Slivkins1
Alexander Skopalik1
Atsushi Iwasaki1
Dimitris Fotakis1
Felix Fischer1
Ingmar Weber1
Ioannis Caragiannis1
Jiehua Chen1
Joseph Halpern1
Kevin Leyton-Brown1
Kostas Kollias1
Manolis Zampetakis1
Martin Hoefer1
Mihaela van der Schaar1

Papers

Title
An Equilibrium Analysis of Scrip Systems
An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure
Auctioning Time: Truthful Auctions of Heterogeneous Divisible Goods
Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits
Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness: Extensions, Limitations, and Indivisibilities
Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games
Display Advertising Auctions with Arbitrage
Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply
Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction
How to Put Through Your Agenda in Collective Binary Decisions
Incentives in Large Random Two-Sided Markets
Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'12
Introduction to the Special Issue on WINE'13
On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets
Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers
Private Pareto Optimal Exchange
Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium
Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games
Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods
Safe Opponent Exploitation
Secondary Spectrum Auctions for Symmetric and Submodular Bidders
Single-Call Mechanisms
Socially-Optimal Design of Service Exchange Platforms with Imperfect Monitoring
Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas
The Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information
To Match or Not to Match: Economics of Cookie Matching in Online Advertising
Traffic Shaping to Optimize Ad Delivery
Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design