From Relay Attacks to Distance-Bounding Protocols

Gildas Avoine, Ioana Boureanu, David Gérault, Gerhard P. Hancke 0002, Pascal Lafourcade 0001, Cristina Onete, Gerhard Petrus Hancke, Pascal LafourcadeSecurity of Ubiquitous Computing Systems 2021 · DOI · DBLP

Abstract

Distance-bounding (DB) protocols serve as a critical defense against relay attacks, where an adversary "teleports" a victim's credentials to a remote reader. By leveraging the physical limit of the speed of light to measure round-trip times (RTT), these protocols ensure that a prover is not only cryptographically valid but also physically present within a specific proximity.

Introduction: The Relay Attack Challenge

The core security challenge in contactless transactions—such as credit card taps or keyless car entries—is the relay attack, also known as "Mafia Fraud." Standard cryptographic methods prove identity but fail to verify location. An attacker can bridge the distance between a victim’s card and a legitimate reader using two devices. Since the attacker merely forwards valid encrypted messages, standard encryption cannot detect the intrusion. Distance-bounding protocols address this by binding a prover’s identity to their physical proximity.

Protocol Mechanisms

Distance-bounding protocols typically consist of three phases: session set-up, a fast proximity-checking phase, and a final verification phase.

  • Round-Trip Time (RTT) Measurement: The verifier sends a challenge and measures the time until a response arrives. Since signals cannot travel faster than light ($c$), the distance $d$ is bounded by $d \leq \frac{\Delta t \cdot c}{2}$.
  • Hancke-Kuhn Protocol (2005): A symmetric-key cornerstone that uses a Pseudorandom Function (PRF) to pre-calculate response registers. During the "fast phase," the prover responds to single-bit challenges by picking bits from these registers.
  • Brands-Chaum Protocol: A public-key approach using bit-commitments and digital signatures to prevent "pre-ask" attacks.
General structure of a distance-bounding protocol showing session setup, RTT-based proximity checking, and final verification.

Physical Layer Vulnerabilities and Threat Models

Security in distance bounding requires looking beyond logical bits to the physical layer. Attackers may employ strategies like "Early Send" (guessing a bit before it fully arrives) or "Late Commit" (sending a signal late with higher power to overwrite the bit period) to trick a verifier into perceiving the prover as closer than they are.

Comparison of honest and dishonest NRZ signal timing, illustrating how an attacker might manipulate signal arrival times.

The paper categorizes four distinct fraud types:

  1. Mafia Fraud: External relay attack.
  2. Distance Fraud: A dishonest prover attempts to appear closer.
  3. Distance Hijacking: A dishonest prover exploits an honest prover's proximity.
  4. Terrorist Fraud: A dishonest prover collaborates with an accomplice without revealing their long-term secret key.

Practical Implementation and Results

Implementing these protocols involves significant engineering trade-offs between security and efficiency.

  • Protocol Efficiency: The Hancke-Kuhn protocol offers a $3/4$ probability of detecting an attacker per round. High security requires many rounds, increasing transaction time.
  • Commercial Adoption: Real-world implementations include 3DB Technology (using Ultra-Wide Band for 10cm accuracy in automotive keys), NXP Mifare (DESFire EV2), and EMV PaySafe (a "lite" version for payment infrastructure).

Limitations and Future Directions

Implementing nanosecond-precision clocks on cheap, passive RFID tags remains a hurdle. Furthermore, backwards compatibility in sectors like EMV payments makes adopting "clean-slate" protocols difficult. Future work focuses on application-aware protocols tailored to the processing power of the device (e.g., smartphones vs. passive cards) and leveraging 5G high-frequency bands for higher precision.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{avoine2021from,
  author = {Gildas Avoine and Ioana Boureanu and David Gérault and Gerhard P. Hancke and Pascal Lafourcade and Cristina Onete and Gildas Avoine and Gerhard Petrus Hancke and Cristina Onete and Ioana Boureanu and Pascal Lafourcade},
  title = {{From Relay Attacks to Distance-Bounding Protocols}},
  booktitle = {Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems},
  year = {2021},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-10591-4\_7},
}
Figure