A Practical Generic Relay Attack on Contactless Transactions by Using NFC Mobile Phones

Lishoy Francis, Gerhard P. Hancke, Keith MayesInternational Journal of RFID Security and Cryptography 2013 · DOI

Abstract

Contactless technology is widely used in security sensitive applications, including identification, payment and access-control systems. Near Field Communication (NFC) is a short-range contactless technology allowing mobile devices to act primarily as either a reader or a token. Relay attacks exploit the assumption that a contactless token within communication range is in close proximity, by placing a proxy-token in range of a contactless reader and relaying communication over a greater distance to a proxy-reader communicating with the authentic token. It has been theorised that NFC-enabled mobile phones could be used as a generic relay attack platform without any additional hardware, but this has not been successfully demonstrated in practice. We present a practical implementation of an NFC-enabled relay attack, requiring only suitable mobile software applications. This implementation reduces the complexity of relay attacks and therefore has potential security implications for current contactless systems. We also discuss countermeasures to mitigate the attack.

Introduction: The Proximity-as-Trust Model

Contactless technology (NFC/RFID) relies on an implicit assumption: if a token, such as a credit card or key fob, is communicating with a reader, it must be physically close. This "proximity-as-trust" model is the foundation for millions of daily transactions.

A relay attack breaks this assumption. In this scenario, an attacker places a "proxy-token" near a legitimate reader and a "proxy-reader" near the victim’s actual card. By shuttling data between these two proxies over a long-distance link like Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, the attacker can "teleport" the card's presence to a distant reader. While theoretically possible, previous relay attacks usually required custom-built hardware. This research explores whether off-the-shelf, unmodified smartphones can be used as a generic, stealthy platform for these attacks.

Methodology and System Architecture

The researchers developed a system using two commercially available NFC-enabled phones. The Proxy-Reader (a Nokia 6131) acts as a standard reader to pull data from the victim's card. The Proxy-Token (a BlackBerry 9900) utilizes the "soft-SE" (Software Secure Element) API to emulate a passive contactless token.

The relay attack architecture showing the communication flow between the token, proxy devices, and the reader.

The two phones communicate via Bluetooth L2CAP, chosen for its low latency. The software is application-independent, forwarding raw APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit) commands without needing to decrypt the underlying transaction logic.

Experimental Scenarios

The attack was evaluated against four real-world scenarios to test its versatility:

  1. Test Applet: A basic Java Card applet to verify command-response timing.
  2. Legacy Payment System: A contactless Point-of-Sale (POS) terminal using static authentication.
  3. e-Passport System: A setup involving the transfer of high-resolution JPEG photos.
  4. MIFARE DESFire EV1: A common smart card technology used in public transport and access control.

Key Results and Timing Analysis

The attack achieved a 100% success rate across all tested systems. One of the most significant findings was the leniency of current reader timeouts. While a standard card transaction takes approximately 150ms, the relay attack increased this to roughly 665ms. However, the researchers discovered that POS terminals would wait up to 35 seconds for a response, making the added latency of the relay attack practically invisible to the system.

Comparison of execution times (in ms) for various commands across different Secure Element implementations.

As shown in the timing data, the relay (Proxy-Token on "soft-SE") is significantly slower than a standard smart card, yet it remains well within the operational tolerances of commercial readers. The attack worked reliably over 15 meters through walls and up to 35 meters in open spaces using Bluetooth.

Discussion and Countermeasures

The shift toward software-based NFC emulation (soft-SE) has inadvertently lowered the bar for attackers by removing the need for specialized hardware. Furthermore, using smartphones provides a "stealth factor"; an attacker holding a phone near a payment terminal appears normal to bystanders.

To mitigate these risks, the authors proposed a Location-as-Security-Metric countermeasure. By comparing the GPS and Cell-ID data of the card and the reader, the system can detect a relay if the devices are geographically separated (e.g., more than 6 meters apart).

Limitations

The attack currently fails against systems like Mifare Classic that use proprietary encryption for parity and CRC bits. Because the phone's NFC controller automatically handles these bits before they reach the software layer, the "soft-SE" cannot accurately relay them. Future work will focus on hardening mobile operating systems to restrict which applications can register for sensitive Application Identifiers (AIDs) used in financial transactions.

Summary updated

Abstract

Contactless technology is widely used in security sensitive applications, including identification, payment and access-control systems. Near Field Communication (NFC) is a short-range contactless technology allowing mobile devices to act primarily as either a reader or a token. Relay attacks exploit the assumption that a contactless token within communication range is in close proximity, by placing a proxy-token in range of a contactless reader and relaying communication over a greater distance to a proxy-reader communicating with the authentic token. It has been theorised that NFC-enabled mobile phones could be used as a generic relay attack platform without any additional hardware, but this has not been successfully demonstrated in practice. We present a practical implementation of an NFCenabled relay attack, requiring only suitable mobile software applications. This implementation reduces the complexity of relay attacks and therefore has potential security implications for current contactless systems. We also discuss countermeasures to mitigate the attack.
BibTeX
@article{francis2013practical,
  author = {Lishoy Francis and Gerhard P. Hancke and Keith Mayes},
  title = {{A Practical Generic Relay Attack on Contactless Transactions by Using NFC Mobile Phones}},
  journal = {International Journal of RFID Security and Cryptography},
  year = {2013},
  doi = {10.20533/ijrfidsc.2046.3715.2013.0012},
}
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